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CUBAN REFUGEE INSUREDS AND THE ARTICLES
OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND
RicHARD R. PAuDisE*
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

The International Monetary Fund, a specialized agency of the
United Nations, is an intergovernmental organization whose members
include one hundred two countries outside the Soviet bloc.' The
Fund represents the applied thinking of those economic authorities
who were concerned with preventing the financial turmoil of the
period between World Wars I and II, particularly in the 1930's, from
becoming a part of the post-World War II pattern of life. In large
measure such financial turmoil had been the product of exchange
restrictions, competitive devaluation, discriminatory currency arrangements, and multiple currency practices. Accordingly, at the Bretton
Woods Conference in 1944 the International Monetary Fund was
conceived of and designed to serve the member nations that would
adhere to a code of international good behavior through agreed exchange rates and liberalized international payments. It was further
contemplated that the resources of the Fund, made up of subscriptions
by member nations, would be utilized to assist member nations experiencing international monetary difficulties.2
As an international organization the Fund evidences three fundamental departures from the characteristics of most other international
bodies. In the first place, a system of weighted voting, which is based
upon the subscriptions of the respective members to the Fund, has
been adopted under article XII, section 5 of the Fund Agreement.
Secondly, the Fund is authorized to exercise a measure of control
under the Fund Agreement over matters that would ordinarily fall
within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of its members. Thirdly,
the Fund is distinctive because of its tripartite functions: financial,
consultative, and regulatory. 3 On the financial side, the Fund through
*A.B. 1948, Harvard College; B.A. (Law) 1950, MA. 1955, Cambridge University
(Fiske Scholar); Academy of International Law, The Hague, 1949 and 1951; Member
of the District of Columbia Bar and the United States Supreme Court Bar; Member
Gray's Inn, London.
1. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANN. RP. 8 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
2.
3.

IMF, INTRODUCTION TO THE FUND 1-2 (1964).
FLEMING, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ITS FORM AND FUNCTIONS 3

(1964).
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the subscriptions of its members, has both a pool of currencies and
gold resources with which to provide foreign exchange to members
who are experiencing balance of payments difficulties. The consultative functions of the Fund involve (1) annual consultations with
article XIV members concerning the removal of restrictions on current
(international) transactions, (2) consultations at the request of
member governments concerning particular economic problems, (3)
consulations with GATT on the balance of payments justification for
trade restrictions, and (4) annual consultations, at the option of the
member, with article VIII member countries. 4 The regulatory functions of the Fund are concerned with the supervision of exchange
rate practices, the elimination of restrictions on current international
payments, and the elimination of both multiple currency practices and
discriminatory currency arrangements. 5
The Articles of Agreement of the Fund, commonly known as its
charter, became effective on December 27, 1945. The Articles delineate not only the Fund's powers and responsibilities but also the
obligations and rights of countries that become members of the
Fund. Each country by signing the Articles of Agreement becomes
obligated to the other member nations to adhere to the code of international monetary conduct consistent with the provisions and purposes of the Fund Agreement. The key article concerning the obligations of members of the Fund is article VIII, which imposes definite
restrictions upon the freedom of unilateral action of any member
country. Under article VIII member countries are required to withhold judicial assistance if enforcement of a claim will result in the
contravention of exchange control laws of a member country imposed
consistently with the Fund Agreement.6 This paper will deal with
problems that have arisen under article VIII in connection with
suits in courts by Cuban refugees for the cash surrender value of
insurance policies issued to them in Cuba by American and Canadian insurance companies.
The cases discussed in this paper are concerned with two aspects
of article VIII. First, whether certain Cuban laws raised as a defense
by the insurers were maintained or imposed consistently with Cuba's
obligations as a member country of the Fund. And second, whether
the state and federal courts of the United States were bound by reason
4.

IMF, INTRODUcTiON TO THE FUND 5-7 (1964);

FLEMING, op.

cit. supra note 3,

at 19.
5. FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 3, at 5.
6. Judicial authorities of a member are obligated not to assist a party to secure
performance of an exchange contract that is contrary to another member's exchange
control regulations where such regulations are maintained or imposed consistently
with the Fund Agreement.

IMF, SaELECT.D DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE DREcTORs

68 (2d issue 1963).
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of the obligations of this country under article VIII of the Fund
Agreement to refuse to enforce the claims of Cuban refugees under
policies of life insurance.
On December 27, 1945, the United States enacted into law the
provisions of the International Monetary Fund Agreement.7 From
that time until 1963, American courts seldom were called upon to
interpret the Fund Agreement; 8 it was not until suits involving
Cuban refugee insureds of American and Canadian insurers were
commenced that wide areas of uncertainty became apparent. As
a direct result of these suits it has become clear that the scope and
effect of the provisions of the Fund Agreement must be reappraised,
so that the courts may adequately deal with future litigation involving
the Agreement.
7. 59 Stat. 512, 22 U.S.C. §286 (1964).
8. During this period the courts reached the following conclusions regarding
the Fund Agreement: fear that the Fund Agreement may not work satisfactorily
does not justify refusal to recognize United States adherence to the Fund Agreement,
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); the fact that exchange control regulations of a member country may be contrary to public policy in the state where
suit is brought does not justify refusal to enforce those exchange control regulations, Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d
6 (1953); foreign exchange control regulations are not against public policy if
they are used as a defense to the enforcement of a contract that was entered into
and was to be performed in another country, id. at 537, 110 N.E.2d at 7; withdrawal from the Fund Agreement will no longer render a contract unenforceable
that contravenes the former member's exchange control regulations, Stephen v.
Zivnostenska Banka, 31 Misc. 2d 45, 140 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1955); the facts in
existence at the time performance is sought rather than at the time the contract
was entered into determine whether an exchange contract is unenforceable under
article VIII, §2 (b) of the Fund Agreement, id. at 47, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 326; the
Fund Agreement prohibits a local court from refusing to give effect to the exchange
control laws of a member on the ground that such foreign laws provide only penal
sanctions for violations, Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. First Nat'l City Bank of
New York, 6 N.Y.2d 454, 160 N.E.2d 833, 190 N.Y.S.2d 352, cert. denied, 361 U.S.
895 (1959); the obligations of the Fund Agreement are between or among states
not individuals so that there is no prohibition upon individuals from entering
into exchange contracts that contravene the exchange control regulations of a
member, Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190
N.E.2d 235, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1963); the judicial
obligation of rendering unenforceable contracts that contravene the exchange control regulations of a member country does not carry with it the right to impose
tort liability on those persons who have executed such illegal contracts, id. at 376,
190 N.E.2d at 237, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 874; the Fund Agreement does not enable a
member country to enforce a revenue law in another member country, id. at 377,
190 N.E.2d at 237, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 875; a claim to recover the value of funds and
securities deposited in the bank of a member country contrary to the exchange
control regulations of another member constitutes an attempted capital transfer
and will be unenforceable when article VIII, §2 (b) is invoked, Kraus v. Zivnostenska Banka, 187 Misc. 681, 64 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 11946).
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Cuba, as of December 18, 1953, became an article VIII member
of the Fund. 9 By formally notifying the Fund of its assumption of
the obligations of article VIII of the Fund Agreement, Cuba undertook that its currency was fully "convertible" and that its residents
would be unrestricted in the use of the peso or foreign exchange
needed for (international) payments.' 0 By accepting the obligations of
article VIII membership, Cuba agreed that it would not maintain
or impose any form of restrictions on payments for current (international) transactions." Cuba remained an article VIII member of the
Fund until April 2, 1964, when that country formally notified the Fund
of its withdrawal from membership.12 Cuba's withdrawal from the
Fund was occasioned by its failure to discharge its repurchase obligations to the Fund." If Cuba had not withdrawn when it did from membership pursuant to article XV, section 1 of the Fund Agreement, it
could have been compelled to withdraw under article XV, section 2.
As a result of Cuba's withdrawal from membership in the Fund, all
obligations that the United States owed to Cuba by reason of mutual
membership in the Fund ceased. The cases and problems discussed
in this article arose during the period of Cuba's membership in the
International Monetary Fund, and the imposition, maintenance and
application of certain exchange control laws and restrictions during
Cuba's membership in the Fund have pointed up the need for clarification of the Fund Agreement. While the validity of these Cuban
laws in relation to the Fund Agreement is a relatively moot question,
as a result of Cuba's withdrawal from the Fund, nevertheless the
problems raised by the Cuban exchange control laws in the Cuban
insurance cases are very important and largely unresolved.
THE CUBAN REFUGEES

With the accession to power of the Castro government in Cuba
there began a mass flight of Cubans to the United States. Many of
the Cuban refugees owned policies of life insurance that had been
issued to them by American and Canadian insurance companies.
These companies did a substantial business in Cuba before Castro
came to power. Since many of these refugee Cubans lacked any means
of support when they arrived in the United States, some of them

9. IMF,
10. IMF,
11.
ACTIONS

TWELFTH ANN.

REP.

ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS

INTRODUCTION TO THE FUND

GOLD, THE
7-8 (1965).

INTERNATIONAL

93 (1961).

22 (1964).

MONETARY

FUND AND PRIVATE BUSINEss TRANS-

12. IMF, Ann. Rep. 8 (1964).
13. Id. at 15.
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made demands under the terms of their policies for their cash surrender value in United States dollars. Their demands were supported
by the fact that in most instances their policies were issued for a face
amount expressed in United States dollars rather than in Cuban pesos.
The problems that the Cuban refugees have encountered in suits
to recover under their policies of life insurance have their source in
the wanton, confiscatory, and arbitrary actions of the Castro government after it came to power in 1959 - actions that a 1962 Report of
the International Commission of Jurists concluded were in violation
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 14 These refugee Cubans were completely deprived, for political reasons, of all rights to
nationality and property. Most of these refugees, who were members
of the Cuban middle class, were, for all intents and purposes, categorized by the Castro government as "counter-revolutionaries" or
traitors. Their initial problems were then compounded by the fact
that all of the Cuban assets of the American life insurance companies
had been confiscated by the Castro government; the Canadian life
insurance companies were fearful that if they made payments to
former Cuban nationals outside of Cuba, their Cuban assets would
also be confiscated. Thus, at the outset, the Cuban insureds were met
with the refusal of the American insurers to make payment on the
ground that the insurers' Cuban assets had been confiscated and
with the refusal of the Canadian insurers to make payment under a
policy anywhere but in Cuba.
The Problems Raised by the Cuban Refugees' Suits
The problems with which this paper is concerned are directly related to the question whether article VIII, section 2 of the Articles
of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund operates to
render unenforceable the claims of Cuban refugees for the cash
surrender values of life insurance or annuity policies in suits in the
American courts. Article VIII, section 2 (a) provides that "no member shall . . . impose restrictions on the making of payments and
transfers for current international transactions." These Cuban refugee suits raise two problems under article VIII, section 2 (a) of the
Fund Agreement: (1) whether payment of the cash surrender values
of the life insurance or annuity policies would constitute a "current
international transaction" or would constitute payments in the nature
of capital transfers and (2) if payment is considered a "current international transaction," whether the Cuban exchange control laws
and regulations, raised as a defense by the American and Canadian
14. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CUBA AND THE RULE OF LAW 96,
112-13 (1962).
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insurers, were "restrictions" on payments and transfers for "current
international transactions," contrary to the provisions of article VIII,
section 2 (a).
Resolution of the two problems posed by article VIII, section
2 (a) is a necessary element in a determination of the enforceability
of the insurance claims in the American courts under article VIII,
section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement. Article VIII 2 (b) provides in

part that:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any
member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with
this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any
member....
Section 2 (b) of article VIII sets up four tests for determining
whether or not a contractual claim will be unenforceable in the courts
of a member country. In the instant cases the tests or problems posed
by section 2 (b) are (1) whether insurance or annuity contracts owned
by the Cuban refugees were "exchange contracts"; (2) whether, if the
insurance or annuity contracts were "exchange contracts," such contracts involved the Cuban currency; (3) whether the insurance or annuity contracts owned by the Cuban refugees in any way contravened
existing Cuban exchange control regulations; and (4) whether the
Cuban exchange control laws and regulations, which were raised as a
defense by the insurers, had been imposed consistently with Cuba's
obligations as an article VIII member of the Fund.
Once issue was joined, the Cuban insureds were met with the
exceedingly burdensome problem posed by application of the act of
state doctrine, particularly as most recently enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,15 and
by the possible applicability of the Fund Agreement so as to render
their claims unenforceable in the United States courts.
THE CUBAN CURRENCY LAWS AND EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS

Pre-CastroRegulations

Cuban Law 13 of December 23, 1948, provided that one year after
the Banco Nacional de Cuba had commenced operations United
States currency would cease to be legal tender and to have debtredeeming force in Cuba. Decree 1384 of April 19, 1951, provided
that after June 30, 1951, obligations were to be discharged in Cuban
currency, regardless of contractual provisions for payment in United
15.

376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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States dollars and all contracts payable to or by Cuban nationals were
required to be paid in Cuba. This law and decree imposed no exchange restrictions.
On December 18, 1953, Cuba notified the International Monetary
Fund that it assumed fully the obligations of article VIII, sections
2, 3, and 4 of the Fund Agreement.-0 The only restrictions that Cuba,
even as late as 1961, held itself out as having, were: (1) a 2 per cent
exchange tax on withdrawals from nonresident accounts if the funds
were sent or used abroad or were made payable in a foreign currency; 17 (2) the necessity for the prior approval of the Cuban Monetary Stabilization Fund with respect to payments of more than one
hundred dollars in United States money per month for any purpose,
including payments for royalties, insurance, transportation, interest,
dividends, profits, commissions, and alimony as well as with respect
to the granting of exchange for personal remittances and for capital
transfers;' s and (3) the requirement that personal remittances exceeding one thousand dollars be made only by bank transfer.' 9
Cuba, after it had accepted the obligations of article VIII membership in the Fund, was one of the few Latin American countries
having virtually no exchange restrictions.20 It freely allowed dollar
remittances to be made to at least one country, since its payments
agreement with Spain provided for the financing of transactions between the two countries through a dollar account. 2' Thus, before the
Castro government came to power in 1959, the 2 per cent tax on
foreign exchange remittances to other countries, including the United
States, appears to have been the only practiced form of exchange
control other than the regulation of capital transfers. 22 The executive directors of the International Monetary Fund have expressly
stated that the Fund had approved Cuba's maintenance of the 2 per
cent exchange tax on foreign remittances, but that any other existing
Cuban restrictions on "current transactions" or discriminatory cur23
rency arrangements did not have the Fund's approval.

16. IMF, TWELFFH ANN. REP. ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 93 (1961).
17. Ibid.
18. Id. at 94-95.
19. Ibid.
20. MmEsELL, FOREIGN EXCHANGE IN THE POSTWAR WORa 305 (1954). See IMF,

TFNTH

ANN. REP. ON EXCHANGE

ESrRICIONS

352 (1959).

21. MIKESELL, op. cit. supra note 20, at 305, n.l.
22. See Gonzales v. Industrial Bank (of Cuba), 33 Misc. 2d 285, 227 N.Y.S.2d
459 (1959), af'd, 12 N.Y.2d 33, 186 N.E.2d 410, 234 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1962).
23. See Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219, 224-25 (SJ).
Fla. 1963).
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Castro Regulations
Law 568 was enacted by the Castro government on October 2,
1959. This law placed foreign exchange transactions, including the
arrangement of financing abroad, under very strict control. Foreign
corporations doing business in Cuba were prohibited from making
payments to Cuban nationals or crediting their accounts with any
sums payable to them except in Cuba without the express authorization of the National Bank of Cuba.2 4 In addition, the Cuban bank
accounts of foreign residents were frozen. Article I (6) of the law
absolutely prohibited the transfer of funds, securities or currencies
to points abroad without the authorization of the Cuban Currency
Stabilization Fund. Article I (10) prohibited the crediting to foreign
bank accounts or the transfer to third parties of amounts collected
abroad that resulted from business transactions or services rendered in
Cuba, regardless of the source or origin of the funds. The imposition
of the controls and restrictions provided by Cuban Law 568 raises
serious doubts that the law was imposed and maintained consistently
with Cuba's obligations as an article VIII member under the Fund
2
Agreement. 5
On July 6, 1960, the Castro government adopted Law 851 in
retaliation for the reduction of Cuba's sugar quota by the United
States. Under this law the President and the Prime Minister were
empowered to order the expropriation of American-owned properties
in Cuba. Law 851 then provided for compensation in the form of
Cuban government bonds maturing in not less than thirty years and
bearing interest at 2 per cent per annum. The proposed bonds were
tied, however, to future American sugar purchases from Cuba and,
accordingly, constituted a mere gesture, lacking in good faith. Among
those companies subsequently expropriated under Law 851 and
Resolution 3 of October 24, 1960, were all the American insurance
companies having branches in Cuba. Law 851 provided for limited
assumption of the liabilities of an expropriated business when such
liabilities were payable in Cuba, in Cuban currency, and to Cuban
2 6

creditors.

Law 930 of February 23, 1961, provided for the regulation of the
issuance of Cuban currency by the Banco Nacional de Cuba, a govern24. Allison, Cuba's Seizure of American Business, 47 A.B.A.J. 48 (1961).
25. It is apparent that Law 568 conflicts with one of the basic purposes of the
International Monetary Fund under article I (iv), which is: "To assist in the
establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current transactions
between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which
hamper the growth of world trade."
26. See Allison, supra note 24, at 49-50. For text of law see 55 Aa. J. INT'L
L. 822 (1961).
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ment agency. It further provided that Cuban pesos were to constitute
the sole legal tender and were to be accepted in payment of any obligation payable in Cuba. It also required that obligations which by
agreement were made payable in any other currency were to be
settled and paid in Cuban pesos. Under this law complete control
over transactions involving foreign exchange was vested in the Banco
Nacional de Cuba.27

THE ARTICLES

OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND

In some eleven suits brought by Cuban refugees in both federal
and state courts, the Canadian and American insurance companies
sought to set up the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund either as a bar to recovery by the insured or as an
2s
excuse for nonperformance.
Never before in a series of cases has the potential effect, both legal
and economic, of the Fund Agreement on the rights of individuals
and private corporations been more clearly brought into focus than
IMF, TI mEENm ANN. REP. ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 89-91 (1962).
28. The provisions of the Fund Agreement were raised on appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Pan American Life Ins. Co. v.
Blanco, 311 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1962); on rehearing in the consolidated cases of
Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co. and Vento Jaime v. Pan
American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962), petition for rehearing denied,
311 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded to the Fifth Circuit for consideration in light of Sabbatino, in 376 U.S. 779 (1964); and on rehearing in
Menendez v. Aetna Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1962), which was also vacated
in light of Sabbatino, in 376 U.S. 781 (1964). On remand of Blanco to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the applicability of
article VIII, §2 (b) of the Fund Agreement was considered in the consolidated
cases of Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., Conill v. Pan American Life Ins.
Co., Lorido y Diego v. American Natl Ins. Co., and Zabaleta v. Pan American Life
Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
In the Florida and Louisiana courts the insurers contended that article VIII,
§2 (b) absolved them from their duties of performance under their policies in
Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Klawans, 137 So. 2d 230 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 162 So. 2d 702 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), quashed and
remanded, 165 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1964), rev'd and remanded with directions to
dismiss, 162 So. 2d 704 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); in Confederation Life Ass'n v.
Ugalde, 151 So. 2d 315 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), rev'd and remanded, 164 So. 2d I
(Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964); in Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Calvo, 151
So. 2d 687 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), judgment quashed, 164 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1964),
reed and remanded with directions to dismiss, 163 So. 2d 345 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964); in Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Raij, 156
So. 2d 785 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), writ quashed, 164 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964); Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 154
So. 2d 450 (La. App. 1963), rev'd, 245 La. 755, 161 So. 2d 70 (1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 997 (1964).
27.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1965],
Art. 3
[Vol. XVIII

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

in the suits brought by Cuban refugees seeking to recover the cash
surrender value of their policies of life insurance in this country.
The Key Articles
Article VI of the Fund Agreement permits members of the Fund
to regulate capital transfers. Section 3 thereof provides:
Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to
regulate international capital movements, but no member may
exercise these controls in a manner which will restrict payments
for current transactions or which will unduly delay transfers of
funds in settlement of commitments, except as provided in
Article VII, Section 3 (b), and in Article XIV, Section 2.
Thus, in effect, member countries of the International Monetary
Fund are given freedom to regulate movements of capital, but they
are restricted from prohibiting payments for current transactions
unless they are availing themselves of the transitional arrangements
of article XIV and have not assumed the obligations of article VIII,
or unless the Fund has declared that a particular currency is scarce
pursuant to article VII, section 3 (b).
Article VIII sets forth general obligations of members and expressly provides for the avoidance of restrictions on current payments
under subsection (a) of section 2 of that article:
SEC. 2 Avoidance of restrictionson current payments (a) Subject to the provisions of Article VII, Section 3 (b),
and Article XIV, Section 2, no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions.
Subsection (b) of section 2 of article VIII is the most far-reaching
of the provisions of the Fund Agreement and calls for deliberate
waiver by members of certain matters ordinarily within their domestic jurisdiction. Subsection (b) specifically requires member
countries to give extra-territorial effect to the exchange control regulations of other members and to refrain from domestic action contrary to such exchange control regulations. It also requires the denial
of judicial relief in actions founded upon exchange contracts which
contravene the exchange control regulations of another member imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement.29 Subsection (b) of
section 2 of article VIII provides:

29. IMF,

XIV, 82-83 (1949); see also GoLD,
115-16 (1962).

ANN. REP. app.

MENT IN THE COURTS
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(b) Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any
member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with
this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territory of any
member. In addition, members may, by mutual accord, cooperate in measures for the purpose of making the exchange
control regulations of either member more effective, provided
that such measures and regulations are consistent with this
Agreement.
Article XIV, section 2 of the Fund Agreement permits members of
the Fund to maintain restrictions on payments and transfers for
"current international transactions" during the post-World War II
transitional period. It is provided, however, that members utilizing
the transitional arrangements of article XIV "shall withdraw restrictions maintained or imposed under this section as soon as they are
satisfied that they will be able, in the absence of such restrictions, to
settle their balance of payments in a manner which will not unduly
hamper their access to the resources of the Fund." Section 3 of article
XIV provides that a member which has availed itself of the transitional arrangements of article XIV "shall notify the Fund as soon
thereafter as it is prepared to accept" the obligations of article VIII,
sections 2, 3, and 4. Section 4, article VIII empowers the Fund to
notify a member that conditions are favorable for the withdrawal by
the member of restrictions and for the assumption by the member of
article VIII status and duties.
Article XVIII of the Fund Agreement provides in subsection (a)
that any question of interpretation of the provisions of the Fund
Agreement arising "between any member and the Fund or between
any members of the Fund shall be submitted to the Executive Directors for their decision."
Article XIX contains a definition of certain of the terms which
are used in other articles of the Fund Agreement. Subsection (i)
makes it clear that the term "current transactions" includes:
(1) all payments due in connection with foreign trade, other
current business, including services, and normal short-term banking
and credit facilities;
(2) payments due as interest on loans and as net income from
other investments;
(3) moderate payments for amortization of loans and for depreciation of direct investments;
(4) moderate remittances for family living expenses.
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The Fund's 1964 Annual Report notes that there are twenty-four
countries, representing over 60 per cent of world trade, which have
accepted the full obligations of article VIII of the Fund Agreement."
This leaves seventy-eight countries which, having become members
of the Fund, still cling to the transitional arrangements provided for
under article XIV of the Fund Agreement. Thus, there are twentyfour countries today that have accepted the basic rule laid down by
article VIII that member countries are bound to adopt a free and
nondiscriminatory system of payments for current transactions and
to provide for the convertibility of the proceeds of current transactions
into other currencies at official rates approved by the Fund. 3' Cuba,
which became an article VIII country in 1953, was one of the earliest
countries to assume the obligations of article VIII membership. As
noted earlier, however, the failure of the Cuban government under
Castro to abide by its commitments to the Fund led to Cuba's withdrawal as a member of the Fund on April 2, 1964.
All the Articles of Agreement of the Fund are to be viewed in
the light of article I of the Fund Agreement which sets forth the following express purposes for which the Fund was created: (1) the
promotion of international monetary cooperation; (2) the facilitation
of the expansion and balanced growth of international trade; (3) the
promotion of exchange stability, the maintenance of orderly exchange
arrangements among members and the avoidance of competitive exchange depreciation; and (4) the rendition of assistance "in the
establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign
exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade."
In determining the full applicability of article VIII, section 2 of
the International Monetary Fund Agreement, it is clear that there
is a wide area of uncertainty as to the full effect and scope of the
provisions of article VIII, section 2 (a) and 2 (b), particularly in view
of the paucity of interpretation attributable, in part, to the relative
newness of the Fund Agreement. This uncertainty is unquestionably
highlighted by the cases involving Cuban refugee insureds. One
factor, however, appears clear in regard to article VIII, section 2 - the
recognition of exchange controls called for by the Fund Agreement
is conditioned on the consistency of such controls with the Fund
Agreement, and recognition of a member country's exchange controls
should be refused when they are not imposed consistently with the
32
Fund Agreement.
30.
31.

IMF,

ANN. REP.

See GOLD,

LAW 188

8-9 (1964).

ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL

(1960).

32. See GOLD, op. cit. supra note 11, at 23; see also Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366
U.S. 187 (1961) (dictum).
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During the time when a member country of the International
Monetary Fund operates under the transitional arrangements of
article XIV of the Fund Agreement, that country has considerable
latitude to adopt and to maintain exchange restrictions on payments
and transfers for "current international transactions." However, once
a member country has declared its acceptance of the obligations of
article VIII, sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Fund Agreement it agrees to
surrender any latitude it formerly had in this regard and becomes
subject to the required approval of the Fund before it may retain,
introduce, or adopt any restrictions on payments for current (international) transactions. 33 In effect, when a country accepts the obligations of article VIII, it is holding itself out as ready, willing, and able
to promote the objects of the Fund, to obligate itself to permit the remittance of payments in connection with foreign trade, to eliminate
discriminatory currency practices, and to create and maintain an
34
atmosphere conducive to international trade.
By accepting the obligations of article VIII membership in the
Fund, including the express obligation to do away with all forms of
restrictions on payments for current transactions, the scope of the
power of the member country to apply and adopt controls even with
respect to capital transfers is thereafter reduced. This follows from
the fact that article XIX, subsection (i), which defines current transactions, makes it clear that certain transactions, which economists
would regard as capital transactions, are to be treated as current
transactions. 35 Thus, article XIX (i) specifies that the term "current
transactions" shall be deemed to include payments of moderate
amounts "for the depreciation of direct investments" and "for the
amortization of loans." Article XIX (i) further provides that the
power of the Fund to define current transactions shall be "without
limitation."
Accordingly, acceptance of article VIII membership status in the
Fund subjects a member to an obligation to adhere to a code of
conduct consistent in all respects with the purposes of the Fund. This
means that once article VIII status is assumed a member country may
not maintain or impose any restrictions on payments for current
international transactions without following the prescribed procedure
for securing Fund approval.3 6 Should any restrictions on payments
33. IMF art. VI, §3 and art. VIII, §2 (a) (1944).
34. IMF art. I, §§ii,
iv, vi (1944).

35. Gorz, op. cit. supra note 31, at 188; GoLD, op. cit. supra note 11, at 12-13;
IMF, op. cit. supra note 2, at 22.
56. The applicable procedure, set forth in §H-4 of the Rules and Regulations
of the Fund, is as follows: "All requests by a member under Article VIII, Sections
2 and 3,that the Fund approve the imposition of restrictions on the making of
payments and transfers for current international transactions, or the use of dis-
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for current transactions be imposed by the article VIII member
without the prior approval of the Fund, such restrictions would
clearly not meet the test of "consistency," laid down under article
VIII, section 2 (b),37 and should not be entitled to recognition by
other member countries.

38

Article VIII, section 2 (b) provides in part that:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any
member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently
with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories
of any member ....

(Emphasis added.)

The tests, which the courts of a member nation are bound to apply
in determining whether the contract in question is unenforceable, are
spelled out in this section. The tests are:
(1) Is the contract an exchange contract?
(2) Does the contract involve the currency of a member
country?
(3)Are the provisions of the contract contrary to the exchange
control regulations of that country?
(4) Are the exchange control regulations of that country maintained consistently with the Fund Agreement?
If the answer to these four tests is in the affirmative, the contract
should be rendered unenforceable.
SUITS BY CUBAN REFUGEES AGAINST CANADIAN

INSURERS DOING

BUSINESS IN FLORIDA

In a number of instances former Cuban nationals, who fled Cuba
after Castro came to power and who had taken up residence in Florida,
criminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices, shall be submitted to the Executive Board in writing, with a statement of the reasons for
making the request." IMF, BY-LAws, RULES AND RtGULATIONS 26 (22d issue, 1962).
37. Article VIII, §2 (b) places strong importance on the consistency of the

exchange regulations with the Articles of Agreement. Thus, IMF art. VIII, §2(b)
states: "Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which
are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or
imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories
of any member. In addition, members may, by mutual accord, co-operate in
measures for the purpose of making the exchange control regulations of either
member more effective, provided that such measures and regulations are consistent

with this Agreement." (Emphasis added.)
38. Article VI, §3 and article VIII, §2 (b) would make it clear that member
countries are not obliged to recognize exchange control regulations that have not
been imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement.
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have brought suit in the Florida courts for the cash surrender value of
policies of life insurance that had been issued by Canadian life insurance companies. In every case the Canadian insurance company issued the policy in question to the Cuban national in Cuba
and, in each instance, the policy was issued and delivered in accordance with then existing Cuban laws. In each instance the policy provided for the payment of premiums in United States dollars at
Havana, Cuba. In every instance the application for the policy was
made in Cuba and was accepted at the head office of the insurer in
Canada, where the policy was issued.
Service was effected upon the Canadian insurers by the medium
of service upon the Florida Insurance Commissioner, pursuant to a
Florida statute that required foreign insurers to appoint the Florida
Insurance Commissioner as their agent for service of process before
they could qualify to do business in Florida. 9 In addition, under
a Florida statute, similar to statutes found in most states, each of the
Canadian insurers was required to maintain in Florida statutory deposits in the amount of 300,000 dollars for the protection of the
foreign insurer's policyholders and creditors. 40
In the defense of the suits brought against them, the Canadian insurers contended that the exchange control laws of Cuba prevented
payment by them of the cash surrender values of the policies in the
United States. 41 In Confederation Life Association v. Ugalde,42 in
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Klawans43 and in Crown Life
Insurance Co. v. Calvo4 the Canadian insurers placed great reliance
upon article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement and contended
that enforcement of the judgments of the circuit court would wrongfully deprive them of treaty rights and immunities since the United
States, Canada, and Cuba were members of the Fund and since the
United States had enacted into law the provisions of the Fund Agree39. FLA. STAT. §624.0221 (1963).
40. FLA. STAT. §624.0211 (3) (1963).
41. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 151 So. 2d 315 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963),
rev'd and remanded, 164 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964).
Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Calvo, 151 So. 2d 687 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), opinion and
judgment quashed, 164 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1964), revd and remanded with directions

to dismiss, 163 So. 2d 345 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964);
Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Luzarraga y Garay, 141 So. 2d 633 (3d D.C.A. 1962), cert.
denied, 143 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1962); Trujillo v. Sun. Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 166
So. 2d 473 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Klawans, 137
So. 2d 230 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962), aJ'd in part, rev'd in part on rehearing, 162 So.

2d 703 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), quashed and remanded, 165 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1964),
rev'd and remanded with directions to dismiss, 162 So. 2d 704 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1964).

42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
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ment. The insurers contended that enforcement of the insurance
contracts of the Cuban refugees would involve the United States in
a violation of its international obligations under an international
treaty; that under the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund the insurers had the right to rely on the Cuban
exchange laws; that enforcement of the insurance contracts would
result in assisting Cuban nationals to circumvent, and require Canadian nationals to violate Cuban law, thereby jeopardizing the
Canadian nationals' business and property in Cuba.4 5 The insurers
alleged that article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement was
controlling because the insurance policies were exchange contracts
within the meaning of section 2(b) and that the Cuban exchange
control regulations applicable to the cases had been imposed con46
sistently with the Fund Agreement.
They also argued that the collection of dollars outside of Cuba
on insurance contracts payable in Cuba would constitute typical international capital movements. In support of their contentions in
this regard, the insurers, apparently having in mind both article VIII,
section 2 (a) and article VI, section 3 of the Fund Agreement, argued
that payment of the cash surrender values of the policies would constitute capital transfers or movements rather than payments in respect
of current transactions. 47 Thus, the insurers argued that payments
of the cash surrender values of the policies bore a direct analogy to
the withdrawal of a savings deposit from one country to another and
that such payments were equally capital movements. 48 It was argued
by the insurers that Cuban Law 568, providing controls with respect
to the transfer abroad of foreign exchange, had been specifically
sanctioned by article VI, section 3 and by article VIII, section 2 (b) of
the Articles of Agreement of the Fund. 49
The arguments of the insurers concerning the applicability of the
Cuban exchange control laws and of article VIII, section 2 (b) of the
Fund Agreement were completely disregarded by the Third District
Court of Appeal of Florida in Ugalde, Klawans and Calvo. In Ugalde
45. Reply Brief for Insurer, pp. 16-17, Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v.
Klawans, 165 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1964); Brief for Insurer, pp. 25, 33, Confederation
Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 164 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1964); Brief for Insurer, p. 30, Crown Life
Ins. Co. v. Calvo, 164 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1964).
46. Reply Brief for Insurer, Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Klawans, supra
note 45; Brief for Insurer, p. 28, Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, supra note
45; Brief for Insurer, p. 29, Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Calvo, supra note 45.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. The insurers' contention that Cuban Law 568 had been specifically approved under article VI, §3 and article VIII, §2 (b) of the Fund Agreement is
completely without foundation since the Fund had only approved the Cuban 2%
tax on foreign exchange remittances.
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the majority opinion of the district court was confined to the right
of Cuba to enact domestic laws affecting currency and exchange and
completely by-passed the extra-territorial effect of such laws or the
effect of these laws in the United States under the Fund Agreement.
Only in the separate opinion of Judge Horton were certain observations raised that were germane to the issues raised concerning the applicability of article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement. Judge
Horton made it dear that in his view the Cuban exchange control
laws (that is, Law 13 of 1948, Law 568 of 1959, and Law 930 of
50
1961) were not designed in any way to have an extra-territorial effect.
Judge Horton further observed that the defendant, Confederation Life
Association, was a foreign corporation authorized to do business in
Florida and that it was required to maintain as trust deposits in
Florida a minimum of 300,000 dollars to be held "for the protection
of the insurer's policyholders and creditors in the United States." 5I
Based on this deposit and other assets of the insurer located in the
United States, he found no possibility of a contravention of any
Cuban exchange control regulations, as alleged by the insurer, since,
in his view, payment could be made without involving the currency
of Cuba or the Cuban assets of the insurer.52
In Ugalde the insurer filed a petition for rehearing with the district court in which the insurer alleged that that court's earlier
opinion had entirely overlooked the Fund Agreement and the fact
that Cuban Law 568 was a currency control regulation that the
United States was bound to observe. The insurer urged that "Cuban
50.

Thus, in Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 151 So. 2d 315, 324 (3d

D.C.A. Fla. 1963), Judge Horton observed: "Even assuming arguendo that the
agreement to pay cash surrender value should be governed by the laws of Cuba,
the appellees would be entitled to payment in United States dollars. The Cuban
laws or decrees upon which the appellant relies do not require a different result.
"The 1948 law simply displaced United States dollars as legal tender currency
for the redemption of debts in the territory of Cuba. The Acts of 1959 and 1961
simply granted power to the Banco Nacional de Cuba to regulate the issuance of
currency and established that 'the coins and bills issued by the Banco Nacional de
Cuba shall be the only ones of legal tender and shall be admitted in payment of
any obligation payable in the Republic. When they have been or are agreed upon
in another currency, they shall be settled and paid necessarily in currency of legal
tender.' These acts only prohibit the export of currency or securities or the transfer of funds to points abroad and do not attempt by their scope, inference, or
implication, to affect funds which may have already been located abroad or
possessed by nationals in other states." (Emphasis added by the court.)
51. FLA. STAT. §624.0211 (3) (1963).
52. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 151 So. 2d 315, 324 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1963) (Horton, J., concurring): "the appellant has funds in Florida and the United
States which it could use to discharge its obligation to the appellee and would
not be forced to violate the laws and decrees of Cuba by exporting currency or
transporting funds from Cuba to the United States."
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currency control regulations applicable to the contract of insurance
upon which suit had been brought positively prohibited any payment
whatsoever outside of Cuba, and that such currency control regulations were entirely consistent with, and protected by, the International
Monetary Fund Agreement. ' ' 53 Confederation Life further contended
that the effect of the court's decision was the conversion of a peso
contract into an exchange contract, which would have a direct effect
on the currency of Cuba. 5 4 Thus, the insurer on appeal and in its
petition for rehearing raised all four of the tests that the courts
should apply in determining the applicability of the Fund Agreement.
In spite of this, the district court refused to consider the possible
applicability of the Fund Agreement since rehearing was summarily
denied by the court.
The Florida Supreme Court subsequently reversed the decision
of the district court, first in Ugalde and subsequently in Klawans and
Calvo (based on its decision in Ugalde) and remanded the causes to
the circuit court with directions to dismiss the insureds' complaints.55
The Florida Supreme Court held that the policy in Ugalde was governed by Cuban Law 13 of 1948 and Decree 1384 of 1951 and that the
Florida courts were obligated under the International Monetary
Fund Agreement to apply the said Cuban law and decree to this
insurance contract.5 6 Fundamental to the court's decision was its
finding that the insurance contract was a Cuban contract payable
in Cuban currency in Cuba and that the Canadian insurer had offered
to make payment of the cash surrender value in Havana. 57
Appeals from the decisions in Ugalde and in Calvo were taken
by the insureds to the United States Supreme Court. The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether a Canadian insurer, which
had offered to pay the cash surrender value of a policy in Havana,
Cuba in pesos, was protected by Cuban Decree 1384 and the Articles
of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund from suit on the
policy in the United States. 58 The Supreme Court denied certiorari
in both cases.5 9

58. Brief for Appellant on Petition for Rehearing, p. 5, Confederation Life
Ass'n v. Ugalde, 151 So. 2d 815 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
54. Id. at 5-6.
55. Cases cited note 41 supra.
56. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 164 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1964).
57. Ibid.
58. Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3144 (U.S. Oct. 20,
1964).
59. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Calvo, 379 U.S. 915 (1964); Confederation Life
Ass'n v. Ugalde, 379 U.S. 915 (1964).
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CASES INVOLVING AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANIES

In Pan American Life Insurance Co. v. Blanco,6 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals had before it an interlocutory appeal by the insurer
from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida striking certain paragraphs of the insurer's answer
wherein the insurer had alleged that it had been relieved of all
obligations under three annuity policies by reason of Cuban Law 13
of 1948, Decree 1384 of 1951, Law 568 of 1959, and Law 851 of 1960.
The district court certified to the Fifth Circuit the question whether
the seizure by the Cuban government of all the assets of Pan American
had relieved it of its obligations under the policies. 6
The insured urged that there were two controlling questions presented: (1) whether Cuban Law 568 of September 29, 1959, terminated
the right of the Blancos, as Cuban nationals, to enforce Pan American's policy obligations to pay in dollars in New Orleans, Louisiana;
and (2) whether the expropriation Resolution 3 of October 24, 1960,
"substituting the Cuban Government as the obligor upon the insurance company's policies outstanding in Cuba" made Pan American's policy obligations unenforceable against it?62
With respect to the first question raised by the insurer, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the insurer argued that Law 568
of 1959 was consistent with the Fund Agreement and that the annuity policies in question were exchange contracts that were subject
to the Cuban exchange control regulations. 63 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals was of the opinion that Law 13 of 1948 did not require that all obligations due Cuban nationals be payable solely in
pesos unless the obligation were actually paid in Cuba. The court
was further of the opinion that Law 568 of 1959 was directed solely
to Cuban residents rather than to the foreign payor of an obligation.64
60. 311 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1962), on remand, 221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
61. Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 311 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 1962).
62. Id. at 426-27.
63. Id. at 427. The Fifth Circuit raised the following questions in footnote
eight to its opinion: "Has Cuba incorporated the Bretton Woods Agreement into
its law as did the United States in Title 22 U.S.C. §286? Has Cuba complied with
its obligations under such agreement? Did Cubas withdrawal from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, on November 14, 1960 (see
Dep't of State Bulletin XLIII, No. 1121, December 19, 1960, p. 945; Encyclopedia
Brittanica Book of the Year, 1962 edition, p. 342 and p. 347) constitute such a
breach of the purposes of the Fund as set forth in Art. I as to render such Agreement ineffective as to Cuba? Are the annuity policies in question 'exchange contracts' within the meaning of Art. VIII, Sec. 2 (b) of the Bretton Woods Agree-

ment?"
64. In footnote nine to its opinion the Fifth Circuit observed as follows: "'The
1948 law, for example, does not require that payment of obligations due Cuban
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On remand to the district court, Blanco was consolidated with
three other cases: Conill v. Pan American Life Insurance Co., Lorido
y Diego v. American National Insurance Co., and Zabaleta v. Pan
American Life Insurance Co.65 In its opinion the district court noted
that Cuba had notified the International Monetary Fund at an earlier
date that it accepted the obligations of article VIII, sections 2, 3, and
4 of the Fund Agreement. The district court expressly recognized
that Cuban Law 568 had not been the subject of a specific decision
by the executive directors of the Fund, but that the executive directors had made a recent statement to the effect that the only Cuban
exchange restriction approved by the Fund was the 2 per cent exchange tax on remittances abroad. 66 The district court found that
the effect of Law 13 of 1948, and Resolution 1384 issued under it, was
to make all preexisting Cuban contracts payable and demandable
only in Cuban pesos if they were to be performed within the territorial limits of Cuba. The court observed that under Resolution 3
of October 24, 1960, promulgated under Law 851 of July 1960, Cuba
had substituted itself as the obligor on the debts and obligations of
the companies and the persons whose properties were expropriated by
section 1 of that Resolution within Cuba.67
The district court held that not only was it not required to give
recognition to the acts of the Castro government but, in addition,
the Castro decrees had no extra-territorial effect and, as a consequence,
neither the persons nor the subject matter of the action were subject
to the sovereignty of Cuba. The court noted that its conclusions in
this regard were compelled by its finding that the assets of the defendant insurers within Cuba bore no relationship to the transitory causes
of action involved in the instant suits. 68 In the view of the court,
these former Cuban nationals, while presently not being political
citizens of any country, were civil citizens of Florida because of their
domicile, and as such were possessed of municipal rights and obligated
by domestic municipal duties.69 And so, under the circumstances, the
Cuban laws did not apply to cover the situation of a Cuban national
nationals be made only in pesos. The law does require that, if an obligation is
paid within the Republic of Cuba, then and in that event only, the national

currency of Cuba, pesos, must be accepted in payment of obligations.
"'Law No. 568' of September 29, 1959, 'is directed not to the party making the
payment but to the resident of Cuba, * 0 0' (Brief of Appellee, pp. 5-6, 14)."
Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 311 F.2d 424, 427-28 (5th Cir. 1962).
65. 221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
66. Id. at 224-25.
67. Id. at 225.
68. Id. at 226. See Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
69. Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219, 227-28 (S.D. Fla.
1963).
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enforcing an executory contract in the forum of another jurisdiction
according to the terms of an obligation existing prior to the passage of
the laws in question. The court further was of the view that the
Cuban laws and decrees could not have any force and effect over
these litigants who were not only outside of Cuba as refugees, but
were also not subject to its in personam jurisdiction. Accordingly,
the court held that the International Monetary Fund Agreement did
0
not have any applicability7
In Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan American Life Insurance Co. and
Vento Jaime v. Pan American Life Insurance Co.71 and in Menendez
v. Aetna Insurance Co.,72 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit expressly followed its earlier decision in Blanco by dismissing the insurers' petitions for rehearing wherein the insurers alleged that article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement required
dismissal of the insureds' complaints.78
In Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Insurance Co., 74 a suit
brought in Louisiana courts, the insurer contended that the exchange
control laws of Cuba, enacted after execution of the insurance policy,
rendered that policy unenforceable by reason of the Fund Agreement.
The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit, in reversing,
held that the lower court had erred by disregarding article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement which, in the court's view, defeated
the insured's right to recover the cash surrender value of his policy.75
70. Id. at 229.
71. 311 F.2d 429, rehearing denied, 311 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1962), vacated and
remanded, 376 U.S. 779 (1964).
72. 311 F.2d 437, rehearing denied, 311 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1962), vacated and
remanded, 376 U.S. 781 (1964).
73. Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429, 437 (5th
Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded, 376 U.S. 779 (1964); Menendez v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
311 F.2d 437, 438 (5th Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded, 376 U.S. 781 (1964).
74. 154 So. 2d 450 (La. App. 1963), revd, 245 La. 755, 161 So. 2d 70, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 997 (1964).
75. Id. at 453-54. The court relied on Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961),
which had involved the question whether an 1881 treaty between the United
States and Yugoslavia entitled the petitioner to inherit personal property located
in Oregon on the same basis as American next of kin and whether such rights had
been taken away or impaired by the Yugoslavian monetary policies exercised in
accordance with later agreements between Yugoslavia and the United States, including the adherence of both countries to the Fund Agreement. The United
States Supreme Court had held that the 1881 treaty entitled the Yugoslavian
relatives to inherit personal property located in Oregon on the same basis as
American next of kin and that their rights had not been taken away or impaired
by the adoption of Yugoslavian exchange control laws and regulations, imposed
consistently with the Fund Agreement, which might have an effect upon the payment to Americans of legacies in the case of a Yugoslavian estate. In holding that
the public policy of Oregon must give way to the treaty arrangements, the Supreme
Court stated:
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The vital question whether the payment of the paid-up amount of
insurance constituted a capital transfer or a current transaction was
not reached.
On review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the decision
and expressly held that the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund did not apply so as to render unenforceable the insured's claim under his policy. 76 The court noted that the intention
of the parties was clearly expressed in the insurance contract, which
was expressed in United States dollars and which had called for
payment of all premiums and payment of the cash surrender value
of the policy at the New Orleans head office. It was the view of the
court that all transactions were obviously intended to be negotiated
in American dollars, and that this was the insurer's interpretation
of the contract. The court further found that the foregoing factors
had led the trial judge properly to the conclusion that Cuban laws
and decrees enacted after the policy became a paid-up policy had no
effect upon the obligation of the insurer. 7
The Louisiana Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the holding
of the court of appeal that article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund
Agreement rendered the insured's policy unenforceable in the United
States since the contract was an American contract, payable in United
States dollars and performable in the United States. The court
further held that the Cuban laws and decrees did not apply to the
insured in Theye y Ajuria, because he was a stateless person residing
in the United States and was not subject to the in personam jurisdiction of Cuba.7
In Pan American Life Insurance Company v. Rai,79 the ap-

plicability of the Fund Agreement was expressly considered and rejected. The insurer had appealed from a summary final decree en-

"The International Monetary Fund (Bretton Woods) Agreement of 1945, supra,
to which Yugoslavia and the United States are signatories, comprehensively obligates participatingcountries to maintain only such monetary controls as are consistent with the terms of that Agreement. The Agreement's broad purpose, as
shown by Art. IV, §4, is 'to promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements with other members, and to avoid competitive exchange
alterations.' Article VI, §3, forbids any participating country from exercising controls over international capital movements 'in a manner which will restrict payments for current transactions or which will unduly delay transfers of funds in
settlement of commitments.. "' (Emphasis added.)
76. Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 245 La. 755, 161 So. 2d 70,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 997 (1964).
77. Id. at 248, 161 So. 2d at 73.
78. Id. at 248-49, 161 So. 2d at 73-74.
79. 156 So. 2d 785 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), rev'd, 164 So. 2d 204, writ of cert.
quashed on rehearing, 164 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
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tered by the circuit court of Dade County, Florida. The decree held
that a policy of life insurance issued to Raij, a Cuban refugee residing in Florida, was still in full force and effect and that the insurer was required to accept premium payments in United States
currency and to pay amounts due under the policy in United States
currency. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District,
subsequently affirmed the decree of the circuit court, Dade County.
On the insurer's petition for rehearing, the district court expressly
rejected the insurer's contention that the Fund Agreement, particularly article VIII, section 2 (b), governed so as to render the contract
unenforceable. The court made it plain that it had considered the
possibility of the applicability of the Fund Agreement at the time of
its original opinion. The court held that since the insurance contract
had been made in the United States with an American company and
had been expressed in dollars and, since premiums had been accepted
in dollars since 1942, and since the effect of the decree of the lower
court only required the insurer to continue to accept premium payments in the United States in dollars, the Fund Agreement had no
applicability. In this regard the district court expressly held that
the instant contract was not an unenforceable contract under the
Fund Agreement since it did not involve the currency of Cuba.so
Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court found the district court's
decision to be in conflict with its decision in Ugalde and quashed and
remanded. 81 On rehearing, however, the Florida Supreme Court reversed itself and quashed its writ of remand.8 2 On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court the question raised by the insurer was
whether the Florida courts' failure to recognize the insurer's defense,
80. Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Raij, 156 So. 2d 785, 786 (3d D.CA. Fla.
1963). "The appellant has filed a petition for rehearing, pointing out that, in
rendering the opinion in this cause, the court overlooked and failed to consider its
contention that this transaction was governed by the Bretton Woods Agreement
relating to the International Monetary Fund and the Federal legislation pertaining
thereto. See: 22 U.S.C.A. §286 et seq. At the time of the original opinion in this
cause, this Agreement was considered and deemed to be not applicable, for the
reason that the contract involved was a contract with an American company, made
in the United States, payable in United States dollars; that premiums had been
accepted in United States dollars since 1942, and that the effect of the chancellor's
decree was only to require the appellant to continue to accept premium payments
in United States dollars. Not only were we of the opinion that the Bretton Woods
Agreement was not applicable to the contract in the instant case, we were further
of the opinion that the Bretton Woods Agreement pertained only to contracts
'involving the currency of any member' of the Fund and that an American contract, upon which payments were to be made to or by the appellant in United
States currency, was not an unenforceable contract within the provisions of
Article VIII, §2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement." (Emphasis added.)
81. Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Raij, 164 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1964).
82. Ibid.
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based upon the Cuban expropriation and exchange control laws, constituted the invalidation of such laws contrary to the act of state
doctrine.8 3 Certiorari subsequently was denied by the United States
Supreme Court in November 1964.84
APPLICATION BY THE COURTS OF THE TESTS CALLED FOR UNDER

ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2 (B)

An analysis of the cases illustrates that the American courts either
have not followed a consistent approach in determining whether
article VIII, section 2 (b) of the International Monetary Fund Agreement applied so as to render unenforceable a Cuban refugee insured's
claim for the cash surrender value of his policy or they have refused
to face the problem. In Klawans, Ugalde, and Galvo the Florida district court was faced with the contentions of the Canadian insurers that
the tests called for under article VIII, section 2 (b) had been met so as
to render the insurance contracts unenforceable. The insurers argued
that the life insurance policies in question constituted "exchange contracts" involving the currency of Cuba within the provisions of article
VIII, section 2 (b), that payment of the cash surrender value of these
policies outside of Cuba would result in capital transfers contravening
Cuban Law 568, and that Cuban exchange control Law 568 had
been specifically approved under article VI, section 3 and by article
VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement, and therefore, it had been
imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement. In Klawans and in
Calvo the district court impliedly rejected these contentions of the
insurers since it did not even discuss them. In Ugalde, however, the
majority of the district court and the Florida Supreme Court viewed
the insurance contract as one that involved the currency of Cuba, and
apparently viewed the insurance policy as an exchange contract. The
Florida Supreme Court further held that Cuban Law 13 of 1948 and
Decree 1384 of 1951 governed payment under the contract and held
that the Fund Agreement obligated the Florida courts to apply the
Cuban law and decree. A fundamental error in the court's reasoning
is to be found in the fact that the law and decree were enacted prior
to Cuba's acceptance of article VIII status in the Fund. Also, the
court did not face the issue squarely because it failed to pass upon
the consistency of the law and decree with article VIII, section 2 of
the Fund Agreement.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Theye y Ajuria, without expressly delineating the tests under article VIII, section 2 (b), found that
83.
1964).
84.

Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Raij, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3144 (U.S. Oct. 20,
Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Raij, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
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the insurance policy in question was not an exchange contract and that
it did not involve the currency of Cuba. The court further held that
the Fund Agreement had no applicability because the Cuban laws
and decrees could not be applied in view of the fact that the Cuban
refugees had lost their nationality and the contract was an American
contract. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the place of performance of a contract is a determining factor in whether or not the
Fund Agreement applies.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Blanco questioned Cuba's entire status with regard to the Fund
Agreement and seriously questioned whether the Cuban exchange
control regulations had been imposed consistently with the Fund
Agreement so as to require recognition. The Fifth Circuit questioned
the consistency of the Cuban laws and regulations by questioning
whether Cuba had given internal effect to the provisions of article
VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement. 5 This is a most significant test of consistency with the Fund Agreement. 6 Since the
record was insufficient on this point, however, the court reached no
decision regarding the consistency of these laws and regulations with
the Fund Agreement. The court further questioned whether the
annuities constituted exchange contracts within the meaning of article
VIII, section 2 (b). By way of dictum the court observed that Cuban
Law 13 of 1948 and Law 568 of 1959 were not designed to have any
extra-territorial effect. In the light of Blanco, it may be argued that
the Fifth Circuit was of the opinion that article VIII, section 2 (b) of
the Fund Agreement did not render the annuity contracts unenforceable since the annuities were not exchange contracts involving the
Cuban currency. The argument is reinforced by the court's per curiam
opinions dismissing the petitions for rehearing in Menendez Rodriguez and in Menendez on the authority of its decision in Blanco.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, on the remand of Blanco, found that the insurance contracts
were not exchange contracts involving the currency of Cuba. The
district court was of the view that the Cuban laws and decrees on their
face did not purport to have any extra-territorial effect and that ex85.

Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 311 F.2d 424, 427 n.8 (5th Cir.

1962).
86. Nussbaum has taken the position that the United States, Britain, and
Canada, among others, have taken explicit steps to confer the quality of internal
domestic law on article VIII, §2 (b) of the Fund Agreement. It is Nussbaum's view
that the exchange control regulations of article VIII member countries, which have
not taken steps to incorporate article VIII, §2 (b) into their domestic law, are not,
as a consequence, maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement.
See Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the International Monetary Fund, 59 YALE
L. J. 421, 428-29 (1950).
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pert testimony had substantiated this conclusion. The court further
questioned whether the Cuban exchange control law (that is, law
568 of 1959) had been imposed consistently with Cuba's obligations
under the Fund Agreement since Law 568 had never been approved
by the executive directors of the Fund. In addition to its findings,
which went to the basic tests under article VIII, section 2 (b), it
would appear that the district court viewed the requirement of consistency with the Fund Agreement as excluding Cuban confiscations
sought to be enforced under the guise of exchange regulations - particularly in the case of political refugees.
In Raij, the Florida district court was of the opinion that the
insurance contract was not an exchange contract and did not involve
the currency of Cuba. A factor taken into consideration by the court
was that the lower court's decree only required the maintenance of
the insurance contract in force and the acceptance by the insurer of
premium payments in United States dollars.
Thus, while the courts of Florida and Louisiana, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida have reached
diverse conclusions on whether the Fund Agreement renders unenforceable the claims of Cuban refugee insureds for the cash surrender
value of their policies, the decisions of these courts have not resulted
in any enlightened analysis of the scope of the Fund Agreement. Indeed, in some instances it is arguable that the decisions of the courts
have complicated rather than developed an understanding of the
scope and effect of article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement.
The Fifth Circuit in Blanco appears to evade a basic issue by passing
over the insurer's contention that one of the crucial issues presented
was whether Cuban Law 568 of 1959 had been maintained or imposed
consistently with Cuba's obligations under the Fund Agreement. Yet
the same court raised the most sophisticated of questions concerning
the consistency of the Cuban laws and decrees by directing inquiry
into whether Cuba had incorporated article VIII, section 2 (b) into
its domestic law.
One may criticize the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Theye y Ajuria and of the Florida district court in Raij insofar as
those courts appear to adopt the very broad general principle that an
insurance contract expressed in dollars and payable in the United
States by an American corporation could not constitute an exchange
contract. Further, both the Fifth Circuit and the federal district
court, on the remand of Blanco, and the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Theye y Ajuria, were clearly wrong in their views that currency control
regulations enacted subsequent to the time a contract was entered into
could have no effect on the enforceability of the contract under
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article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement.8 7 Fortunately, however, the errors of the courts in Theye y Ajuria, Raij, and Blanco do
not go so far as to affect the validity of their conclusions that the Fund
Agreement did not render unenforceable the insurance contracts.
A point missed by all of the courts was the basic question whether
payment of the cash surrender value of the insurance contracts would
have constituted a "capital transfer" or a payment in respect of a
"current transaction." Had the courts, as the insurers urged in
Ugalde, Klawans, and Calvo, adopted the approach of determining
whether such payments were "capital transfers" or "current transactions," their task would have been easier. Once the determination
was made that payment of the cash surrender value of the policies
would have constituted payments in respect of "current transactions,"
the courts could rightly have determined that the Cuban exchange
control laws and regulations had no applicability in the absence of
Fund approval of Cuban restrictions on payments for current transactions.
APPLICATION OF THE TEsTs UNDER ARTICLE

VIII,

SECTION 2 (B)

OF THE FUND AGREEMENT

Were the Insurance Contracts"Exchange Contracts" Within
the Meaning of Article VIII, Section 2(b)?
An "exchange contract" has been variously defined as: a contract
involving the exchange of one currency for another; 88 a contract that
affects the exchange resources of a country;8 9 and transactions having
their bases in contract and involving exchange - whether of currency,
property, or services.90 The prevailing view apparently is that an
exchange contract is one that affects the exchange resources of a
country.91
While there is a conflict of authority as to the proper time for
determining whether a contract constitutes an "exchange contract,"
under the authoritative view such a determination should be made
as of the date when the contract was made; the alternative is that
87. See Meyer, Recognition of Exchange Controls After the International
Monetary Fund Agreement, 62 YAE L.J. 867, 893 (1953); Nussbaum, supra note
86, at 427.
88. Bayitch, Florida and International Legal Developments, 1962-1963, 18 U.
MiAMi L. RELv. 321, 349-50 (1963); Nussbaum, supra note 86, at 426-27.
89. Mann, Money in Public International Law, 26 BRIr. YB. INT'L L. 279
(1949).
90. Meyer, supra note 87, at 887.

91. GoLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND PRIVATE BUSINESs TRANSACTIONS 24-25 (1965).
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the determination should be made at the time the party seeks enforcement of the contract. 2 Under either view most of the insurance
contracts should not have constituted exchange contracts. The insurance contracts in the cases discussed were valid dollar contracts at
the time they were entered into, and this situation had not been
changed by the fact that at the time suits were brought the Cuban
refugees had been deprived of their Cuban nationality and had become residents of Florida and the assets of the American life insurance companies had been confiscated by the Cuban state.
The insurance policies in most of these cases called for payment of
the proceeds in dollars in the United States. But insurance policies
in Ugalde called for payment of the proceeds in dollars in Havana.
And the policy in Zabaleta was voluntarily amended to call for payment of the proceeds in pesos in Cuba, while the policy in Diego called
for payment in pesos in the United States.
The cases are conflicting on whether the Cuban exchange control
laws and regulations had converted the insurance/annuity contracts
from dollar contracts into peso contracts. The Florida district court
in Ugalde and Calvo held that Law 13 of 1948, Law 568 of 1959, and
Law 930 of 1961 had converted the insurance contracts into peso contracts. The Florida Supreme Court, in Ugalde, Klawans, and Calvo
has taken the position that the contracts were converted into peso
contracts pursuant to Law 13 of 1948 and Decree 1384 of 1951 and impliedly under Law 568 and Law 930. The federal district court, on
the remand of Blanco held that Law 13 and Decree 1384 would
have converted the insurance contracts into peso contracts only if
93
they were to be performed within the territorial limits of Cuba.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held in Theye y Ajuria that Law 13
did not convert the insurance contract into a peso contract.
The Florida Supreme Court in Ugalde and Calvo has viewed the
insurance contracts as "exchange contracts" and the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court has left this question unresolved since the Supreme Court also denied certiorari in Theye
y Ajuria, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court had held that
the insurance contract was not an "exchange contract." The
92. Mann, The Private International Law of Exchange Control Under the
International Monetary Fund Agreement, 2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 97, 106-07 (1953)
advances the view that the determination should be made with reference to the
time when the contract was made. But see Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co.,
221 F. Supp. 219, 227-29 (S.D. Fla. 1963); GoLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE
CouRTs 53-54, 64-66 (1962). Memorandum submitted by the United States Solicitor
General, p. 4, on petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in
Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Lorido, 376 U.S. 968, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 990
(1964).
93. Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
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Fifth Circuit in Blanco questioned but did not answer whether the
annuity contracts were "exchange contracts." On the remand of
Blanco, the district court held that the annuity and insurance contracts were not "exchange contracts." This view was shared also by
the Florida district court of appeal in Raij, which the Florida Supreme Court declined to reverse.
Adoption of the view that the time for the determination whether
the insurance/annuity contracts were "exchange contracts" is the
time when demand was made by the refugees in the United States
would lead to the conclusion that such contracts were in most instances not "exchange contracts." Since at the time of demand the assets of the American insurance companies had been confiscated their
insurance contracts would probably not be exchange contracts because
they would not involve the conversion of the Cuban pesos into dollars.
In the absence of this confiscation such a view would not be consistent with the fact that the payment sought under the policies was in
United States dollars, a factor that necessarily would have an effect
upon the exchange resources of Cuba. The factual situation posed,
however, would support a finding that exchange contracts were not
involved. 94 The Cuban assets of the American insurers had been confiscated by the Cuban government and their Cuban operations had
completely ceased. The Cuban refugees had been stripped of their
nationality and no longer resided in Cuba. Payments by American insurance companies, no longer doing business in Cuba, to Cubans domiciled in this country would not affect the exchange resources of Cuba,
and therefore such payments should not be deemed exchange contracts.

In the case of the policies issued by the Canadian insurers in
Ugalde, Klawans, and Calvo, however, a different result would be
required since payment by these insurers to the refugees would in
fact affect the exchange resources of Cuba. The Canadian insurers
continued to do business in Cuba and the exchange resources of
Cuba would have been affected by payments made to these insureds
outside of Cuba even though the insureds in Ugalde, Klawans, and
Calvo had become denationalized Cuban residents of the United
States.
Would Payment Under the PoliciesHave Involved the
Currency of Cuba?
Under article VIII, section 2 (b), the term "exchange contracts" is
expressly qualified by the phrase "which involve the currency of any
94. Comment, 18 U.
note 88, at 351.

MIAMI

L. REv. 455, 472-73 (1963); see also Bayitch, supra
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member." The Cuban refugees, it must be remembered, not only
fled Cuba but the Castro government, in almost every instance, published the names of these refugees as enemies of the state and simultaneously stripped them of all personal and property rights as Cuban
nationals. And so, the courts were faced with the fact that the insureds were stateless persons who had established residence in the
United States. While Law 13 of 1948 and Decree 1384 of 1951 provided that payments under the insurance contracts were to be payable
in pesos within Cuba, the actual contractual provisions were not
changed otherwise. Since domicile or residence is the key factor
in determining whether the currency of the member is involved, once
the courts determined that the domicile or residence of these Cubans
was in the United States and that recovery was sought in United
States dollars under their insurance contracts, 95 the courts could properly determine that the Cuban currency was not involved. This conclusion is supported by the fact that payment by the insurers could
not have had any effect upon the Cuban currency since these refugees
could not have been compelled to repatriate the dollar cash surrender
value of their policies. Accordingly, it is clearly arguable that the
separate opinion of Florida district appeal Judge Horton in Ugalde,
the doubt expressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Blanco,
the views of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida on the remand of Blanco, the decision of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Theye y Ajuria, and the decision of the Florida
district court of appeal in Raij are correct and the courts were not
faced with exchange contracts that involved the currency of Cuba
within the meaning of article VIII, section 2 (b).11
The importance of the domicile/residence factor is illustrated in
the leading case of Moojen v. Von Reichert,97 decided by the Court
of Appeals of Paris. One of the vital questions posed was whether
Moojen was a resident of the Netherlands rather than of France. The
court found that Moojen had his residence in the Netherlands and
that Dutch exchange control legislation was applicable to an assignment of shares in a French corporation by Moojen, a Dutch national,
to Von Reichert, a German national. In finding that Moojen's resi95. See GoLD, op. cit. supra note 92, at 145; Blanco v. Pan American Life
Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963); Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Raij,
156 So. 2d 785 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); In re Sik's Estate, 205 Misc. 715, 129 N.Y.S.2d
134 (Surr. Ct. 1965); Rossano v. Manufacturers Ins. Co., [1962] 2 All E.R. 214
(Q.B.).
96. Such a view would appear consistent with the views of the New York
Court of Appeals concerning the phrase "involving the currency" in Banco do

Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y. 2d 371, 191 N.E.2d 235, 239
N.Y.S.2d 872 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964).
97. 51 Revue Critique de Droit International Prive 67

(1962), discussed in

GoLD, op. cit. supra note 92, at 143.
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dence was in the Netherlands, the court then held that the assignment, although expressed in French francs, would affect the Dutch
currency since the Dutch Treasury had a direct interest in a Dutch
resident's repatriation of foreign currency.
Thus, unlike the Cuban refugees, Moojen had maintained his
Dutch residence and nationality and the Netherlands had an undisputed interest in Moojen's repatriation of French francs since the
transaction in question did affect the Dutch exchange resources. In
the case of the Cuban refugees, however, the Cuban government has
no right or interest in the repatriation of any of the funds obtained by
these refugees under their policies in this country. These refugees
had abandoned their Cuban domicile, had subsequently been stripped
of their nationality, and any assets left behind by them in Cuba had
been confiscated.
Clearly, in every suit against the American insurance companies
other than Diego and Zabaleta there should be little difficulty in
finding that the currency of Cuba was not involved within the meaning of article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement. All of the
policies other than those of Diego and Zabaleta were expressed in
dollars. All of the Cuban branches of the American insurance companies had been confiscated on or about October 24, 1960, and all
of their Cuban assets had been taken over by the Cuban government. 98
In the face of these actions of the Cuban government, any claims
that the Cuban government might have asserted against these insurance companies as a result of its confiscation of the rights of the
refugees under their policies were foredosed. 99 On the other hand, the
Cuban refugees, having abandoned their former domicile, having
been stripped of their Cuban nationality, and having become residents
of the United States, could not have been compelled to repatriate any
monies or assets belonging to them in the United States or any
amounts paid to them under their insurance policies.3'o
While the problem is more complex in the suits brought against
the Canadian insurance companies because they had been allowed
to continue to carry on business in Cuba under Castro, the same result could follow. The refugees, at the time of demand for payment
and at the time of suit, were residents of the United States who had
been arbitrarily deprived of their Cuban nationality; they were seeking
recovery under their policies from the insurers' dollar assets. As a
98,

See Allison, Cuba's Seizure of American Business, 47 A.B.A.J. 48, 49-50

(1961); Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219, 225 (S.D. Fla.
1963).
99. Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219, 227-28 (S.D. Fla.
1963).
100. Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963);
Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 245 La. 755, 161 So. 2d 70 (1964).
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consequence, it would seem that the applicable Cuban laws and decrees
should not be controlling so as to require payment in pesos. Further,
the policies were expressed in dollars and the world-wide assets of
the Canadian insurers stood behind their policies, with the result
that there was no necessity for the withdrawals of funds from Cuba
by the insurers.1° 1

Assuming the Insurance Contractsto Have Been Exchange
Contracts,Were They Contrary to Cuban Exchange
Control Laws and Regulations?
Decree 1384 of 1951, promulgated pursuant to Law 13 of 1948,
provided that after June 30, 1951, obligations were to be payable in
pesos rather than in dollars and that all contracts payable to or by
Cuban nationals were required to be paid in Cuba. Under Law 568
of 1959 the export of currency or the transfer of funds abroad without
the approval of the exchange control authorities was forbidden.
Foreign corporations doing business in Cuba were prohibited from
making payments or crediting the accounts of Cuban nationals, except
in Cuba, without the express authorization of the National Bank
of Cuba. Law 568 of 1959 further prohibited the transfer to third
persons of "collections made abroad for business transactions or services rendered in Cuba, regardless of the source or origin of the respective funds." Law 930 of February 1961 provided that obligations,
which by agreement were made payable in any other currency, were
to be settled in Cuban pesos.
In determining whether the insurance contracts were contrary to
the exchange control regulations of Cuba, either the status of the contracts when entered into or the time for performance is the crucial
factor.1 0 2 The contracts when entered into were not exchange contracts
since the dollar was recognized legal tender in Cuba at the time. If,
however, one adopts the position that that date of performance was
the crucial date, then the status of the Cuban refugees at the time
demand was made on the insurers is all-important. Law 13 of 1948
and Decree 1384 thereunder were directed to Cuban nationals. Law
101. Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla. 1963);
Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 161 So. 2d 70 (1964); Pan American
Life Ins. Co. v. Raij, 156 So. 2d 785 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); Pan American Life Ins.
Co. v. Recio, 154 So. 2d 197 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), cert. quashed without opinion,
156 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 990 (1964); Pan American Life
Ins. Co. v. Lorido, 154 So. 2d 200 (3d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied without opinion,
155 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 990 (1964); Rossano v. Manufacturers Life Ins, Co., [1962] 2 All E.R. 214 (Q.B.).
102. Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 31 Misc. 2d 45, 140 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup.
Ct. 1955) (time for performance); GoLD, op. cit. supra note 92, at 64-66, 78 (time
for performance); Mann, supra note 92, at 106-07 (time entered into).
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568 of 1959 prohibited payments to Cuban nationals anywhere but
in Cuba. The intendment of Law 980 of 1961 appears to have been to
require settlement in pesos of contractual obligations with a Cuban
national,resident, or trader.
Once the Cuban State had stripped these refugees of their Cuban
nationality, their status became that of stateless persons residing in
the United StatesO They owed no allegiance to Cuba and were no
longer subject to the sovereignty of the Cuban State since their status
became that of a civil citizen of Florida.104 As such, the refugees were
no longer within the intendment of the exchange control regulations
of Cuba, which on their face were applicable only when Cuban
nationals and residents were involved in a transaction. Accordingly,
by reason of their change of status it is dearly arguable that the
insurance contracts issued by the American insurance companies were
not at the time of performance contrary to Cuban exchange control
regulations. 105
In Ugalde, Klawans, and Calvo, however, the insurance contracts
had been issued by Canadian insurance companies that were doing
business in Cuba through resident affiliates, and had expressly provided for payment of the proceeds in United States dollars in Havana.
Cuban Decree 1384 and Law 568 prohibited the Canadian insurers,
who were doing business in Cuba, from making payments to Cuban
nationals outside of Cuba. Cuban Law 930 of 1961 further provided
for the settlement of obligations in pesos rather than in any other
currency. The view of the Florida Supreme Court that the contracts
in question were Cuban contracts governed by Cuban law appears to
be correct. Even though these insurance contracts had been entered
into prior to the enactment of the cited Cuban laws and decree, these
contracts would have been subject to these laws if they were valid
exchange control regulations.0 0 It is arguable that payment by the
Canadian insurers to the insureds in Ugalde, Klawans, and Calvo
would not have contravened any Cuban exchange control laws but
would instead have contravened only Cuban exchange restrictions.107
If this is the case then the Florida Supreme Court clearly erred in
holding that the International Monetary Fund Agreement prohibited

103. Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219, 227-28 (S.D. Fla.
1963); Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 245 La. 755, 766-67, 161

So. 2d 70, 73-74 (1964).
104. Ibid.

105. In re Sik's Estate, 205 Misc. 715, 129 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sur. Ct. 1954); Rossano
v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., [1962] 2 All E.R. 214 (Q.B.).
106. Mann, op. cit. supra note 92, at 104; Nussbaum, supra note 86, at 427.
107. See Go,-, op. cit. supra note 91, at 8, 9, 11; Bayitch, supra note 88, at

350.
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the Canadian insurers from paying the claims of Ugalde, Klawans,
and Calvo in the United States. 08
Were the Applicable Cuban Exchange Control Laws and Regulations
Imposed Consistently With the Fund Agreement?
The fundamental test under article VIII, section 2 (b) is whether
the exchange control laws and regulations, which render an exchange
contract unenforceable, have been maintained or imposed consistently
with the member country's obligations under the Fund Agreement. 1°9
The fundamental nature of this test has been recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Kolottrat v. Oregon 1o and was recognized and asserted by the insurers in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Blanco and in the Florida courts in Ugalde, Klawans, and
Calvo. The Florida Supreme Court in Ugalde did not go into the
factors governing consistency and did not decide whether payment
under the policies would have constituted "capital transfers" or
payments in respect of "current transactions." The court impliedly
held, however, that the applicable Cuban laws were consistent with
the Fund Agreement."' The Fifth Circuit in Blanco, on the other
hand, questioned the consistency of the Cuban laws and decrees with
the Fund Agreement, 1 2 and on its remand the district court was of
the opinion that Law 568, which it viewed as the governing law, had
not been imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement.
Under the consistency test inquiry must be directed to the question whether the exchange control laws and regulations of an article
VIII member operate to restrict payments in respect of "current
transactions." In the event that such laws and regulations do restrict
such payments, and in the event that special permission of the Fund
has not been obtained, such exchange control laws and regulations
have not been maintained or imposed consistently with that member's
obligations under the Fund Agreement. Therefore, it must be ascertained whether laws and decrees apply only to capital transfers and
not to payments with respect to current transactions. This was recog108.

IMF art. VIII, §2 (a) and art. VI, §3 (1944).

109. In providing that article VIII, §2 (b) of the Fund Agreement should be
given full force and effect in the United States, Congress certainly must have intended and understood that the test of consistency should be paramount. See
H.R. REP. No. 629, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 70 (1945); S. RaP. No. 452 (79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 28 (1945). Mr. Gold, General Counsel of the Fund, has expressly stated
that consistency with the Fund Agreement is an express and obviously necessary
condition. See GoLD, op. cit. supra note 91, at 23.

110. 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
111.
112.

Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 164 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1964).
Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 311 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1962).
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nized by the insurers in Ugalde, Klawans, and Calvo for they placed
great stress on the contention that payments under the policies
would constitute capital transfers. An additional and more complicated test of consistency was raised by the Fifth Circuit in Blanco,
for that court was of the view that the provisions of article VIII,
section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement must be incorporated into domestic law before the exchange control laws can be deemed consistent with the Fund Agreement.
It would appear that the laws in effect as late as 1961 compel conflicting conclusions with respect to Cuba's adherence to its obligations
as an article VIII member. Law 13 of 1948 and Decree 1384 of 1951
substituted Cuban pesos for dollars as domestic legal tender and required the payment of obligations to Cuban nationals to be made in
Cuba.11 3 However, Law 568, enacted in September 1959 - almost
six years after Cuba had accepted the obligations of article VIII
membership, clearly was designed to impose restrictions on payments
for current international transactions. This view gains support from
the far-reaching language of article I of Law 568, which made it a
felony not only to make payments in respect to ordinary commercial
transactions without the prior approval of the Cuban Currency
Stabilization Fund, but also "to receive and credit to bank accounts
kept abroad, or to transfer to third parties collections made abroad
for business transactions or services rendered in Cuba, regardless
of the source or origin of the respective funds.114
Law 930 of 1961, which provided that obligations payable in any
currency other than pesos were to be paid in pesos, raises questions
that are difficult to resolve. If directed solely to payments to Cuban
residents or nationals or to firms doing business in Cuba, it would
appear consistent with the purposes of the Fund. If the law was intended to have extra-territorial effect, however, it would run counter
113.

See Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 311 F.2d 424, 427-28 (5th Cir.

1962).
114. Mr. Gold, General Counsel of the Fund, in referring to the Fund Agreement's provisions for the abolition of exchange restrictions on payments in respect
of current transactions, has stated that the term "Restriction" means any real
interference with payments and transfers for current international transactions.
Accordingly, an article VIII member cannot hamper or restrict "out-payments"
although the member may regulate "in-payments" through the device of prescribing the currency payable to its residents. Gold notes that it would be contrary to the Fund Agreement for an article VIII member to prescribe the currency
in which its residents can make payments and to bind other members to require
residents of such other members to receive only the prescribed currency. GOLD,
THE INTERNATIONAL

MONErARY FUND AND

PRIVATE BusINss

TRANSACrIONS: SOME

LEGAL "FFEcTs OF TnE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT 8-9 (1965); see also Mann, Money
as a Matter of InternationalOrganization, 96 HAGUE ACADEMY RECUEIL DES CouRs

19, 64-65 (1959).
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to articles VI (3) and VIII (2) (a) of the Fund Agreement and would
not be consistent with the Fund Agreement unless prior approval
had been obtained.1 15
It appears that the executive directors of the International Monetary Fund have never made a decision on whether or not Cuban Law
568 of 1959 was consistent with Cuba's obligations as a Fund member.
The executive directors' statement with respect to Cuba, however,
makes it clear that the only sanctioned exchange control, other than
controls of capital transfers, was the 2 per cent exchange tax on
foreign remittances.116 In practice, Cuban exchange control laws and
regulations since the Castro government came to power demonstrate
not only discriminatory application on the part of the Cuban government, but also an exceptionally close affiliation to acts of confiscation
by that government. 117 In purpose and effect Cuban Law 568 runs
counter to such express purposes of the Fund as "the expansion and
balanced growth of international trade" (article I (ii)), the maintenance of "orderly exchange arrangements among members" (article
I (iii)), and the "elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which
hamper the growth of world trade" (article I (iv)). Cuban Laws 568
and 930 also violate the interdict of article VIII, section 2 (a) since
their intendment is to impose restrictions on payments and transfers
for current international transactions.1 8 There is good reason to conclude, therefore, that Cuban exchange controls maintained or imposed
since 1953, when Cuba became an article VIII member of the Fund,
do not meet the test of consistency under article VIII, section 2 (b).
Utilization of the "consistency" test would have called for an
analysis of whether Law 13 of 1948 and Decree 1384 of 1951 were
being "maintained" and whether Law 568 and Law 930 had been
"imposed" consistently with Cuba's obligations as an article VIII
member of the Fund. It is arguable that Law 568 and Law 930
apply to transactions of any nature involving not only Cuban
nationals or residents or corporations doing business in Cuba but also
third parties having dealings with Cuba or Cubans. These laws ap115. GoLD, op. cit. supra note 114, at 9.
116. This was pointed out by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida in the remand of Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221
F. Supp. 219, 224 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
117. The intent of the Cuban government to restrict payments in respect of
current transactions as well as capital transfers is evidenced by the fact that Law
568 and Instruction 4, the basic foreign exchange regulation, were utilized prior
to confiscation of American companies, to refuse foreign exchange to the American oil companies that these companies needed for the purpose of paying for
crude oil imports into Cuba. See Allison, supra note 98, at 48-49.
118. See discussion in GoLD, op. cit. supra note 114, at 8-9; see Comment, 18
U. MIAMI L. REv. 455, 475 (1963).
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pear to apply not only to payments involving "capital transfers" but
also to payments for "current transactions." Accordingly, the insurers
should have been called upon to bear the burden of proving that
the Fund had sanctioned the Cuban laws and decrees upon which
they relied."1 9 The District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, contrary to allegations of the insurers, on the remand of
Blanco, expressly found that Cuban Law 568 did not have Fund
approval.120 On the other hand, one may imply from the decision in
Ugalde, that the Florida Supreme Court assumed "consistency" because of the apparent adoption by the district court of the insurer's
erroneous allegation that the Fund had approved of Law 56821
Despite the importance of applying the consistency test to determine whether or not exchange controls must be given - effect, it is
questionable, in the light of the recent Supreme Court decision in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,122 whether American courts
will ever be able to apply this test to the exchange control laws and
regulations of another country even in view of the fact that the courts
are faced with the question of interpretation of an international treaty.
The ramifications of this problem are greater than would superficially
appear.
The act of state doctrine, which was raised by the insurers as a defense in certain of the Cuban insurance cases, embraces the concept
that "every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit
in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within
its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must
be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves. ' $123 The only exception to this doctrine
which was recognized prior to Sabbatino, was when the executive
branch, under the so-called Bernstein exception, made it known
to the court that the act of state doctrine may be suspended.24
Sabbatino holds that the courts of this country will not examine
the validity of a taking of property by a recognized foreign country
within its own territory "in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the
119. See Nussbaum, supra note 86, at 427; The Courtrai case (an unreported
decision of the Commercial Tribunal of Courtrai, Belgium) discussed in GoLn,
op. cit. supra note 92, at 79-81.
120. Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219, 224-25 (S.D. Fla.

1963).
121.
122.
123.

Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 164 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1964).
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).

124. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

37

Law Review,
18, Iss.
UNIVERSITY Florida
OF FLORIDA
LAW Vol.
REVIEW

1 [1965],
Art. 3
[VoI. XVllI

complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international
law."125 Thus, in Sabbatino the Supreme Court has expressly held
that, even though acts of expropriation by a country may be clearly
contrary to international law, American courts will not examine the
validity of the taking in the absence of a treaty or unambiguous agreement.
The Sabbatino decision raises some exceedingly complex problems
in connection with the suits brought in this country by Cuban refugees
to recover the cash surrender value of policies of life insurance issued
by American and Canadian insurers. There is, on the one hand, the
possibility that the majority decision in Sabbatino will be interpreted
to exclude from the ambit of the act of state doctrine another
country's confiscation of contractual claims and rights in a manner
calculated to have an extra-territorial effect. On the other hand,
however, the reasoning of the majority in Sabbatino poses the possibility that the court has foreclosed any judicial inquiry predicated
upon the recognized principle of the territorial limitation of acts of
confiscation.126 This view gains credence from the fact that, following
the rejection by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of the applicability of the act of state doctrine in Menendez Rodriguez v. Pan
American Life Insurance Co.1 27 and in Menendez v. Aetna Insurance
12s
Co.,
the United States Supreme Court vacated judgment for the

insureds and remanded the cases to the Fifth Circuit with directions
to consider the possible applicability of the act of state doctrine in the
light of Sabbatino.
An even more basic problem, from the point of view of this paper,
is whether the majority decision in Sabbatino has any relevance to
the role of the American courts in connection with the interpretation
and application to a given state of facts of the provisions of a multi125. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
126. Id. at 431-32, where the majority stated: "Judicial determinations of
invalidity of title can . . . have only an occasional impact, since they depend on
the fortuitous circumstances of the property in question being brought into this
country. Such decisions would, if the acts involved were declared invalid, often be
likely to give offense to the expropriating country; since the concept of territorial
sovereignty is so deep seated, any state may resent the refusal of the courts of
another sovereign to accord validity to acts within its territorial borders....
"The dangers of such adjudication are present regardless of whether the State
Department has, as it did in this case, asserted that the relevant act violated
international law. ."
127. 311 F.2d 429, rehearing denied, 311 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1962), vacated and
remanded, 376 U.S. 779 (1964), remanded to district court, 340 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.

1965).
128. 311 F.2d 437, rehearing denied, 311 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1962), vacated and
remanded, 376 U.S. 781 (1964), remanded to district court, 340 F.2d 708 (5th Cir.

1965).
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lateral treaty such as the International Monetary Fund Agreement.
While the Court in Sabbatino expressly limited its decision to cases involving customary international law and has excepted from the act
of state doctrine cases involving a "treaty or other unambiguous
agreement," nonetheless the majority of the Court clearly evidenced
an intent to limit the bounds of judicial competence to areas of "consensus," "agreed principle," or "codification." As a consequence, it
is a matter of some concern whether the International Monetary Fund
Agreement, though a treaty, constitutes a permissible area for the
exercise of judicial competence. This concern is a direct result of
the fact that the Fund Agreement - in particular article VIII- because of the complexity of its provisions, unquestionably presents
problem areas in which both the courts and the experts have expressed divergent views. Resolution of the problem will have to
await an answer by the courts.
Article VIII, section 2 of the Fund Agreement is the most complicated of the provisions of the Fund Agreement and clearly is not
"unambiguous." One may ask, therefore, whether Sabbatino will be
extended to foreclose judicial determination of the ultimate question
of the consistency of an article VIII member's exchange control
regulations with the Fund Agreement when such exchange control
regulations have been raised as a defense in private suits.
A possible solution to the impasse that would be created by a foreclosure of application of the "consistency" test in the American courts
would be for the courts to assume the consistency of an article VIII
member country's exchange control laws with the Fund Agreement,
but to condition this assumption upon a literal interpretation of the
Fund Agreement. In assuming the "consistency" of an article VIII
member country's exchange control regulations with the Fund
Agreement, there should be a presumption that the article VIII member's exchange control regulations do not intend, operate, or purport
to restrict payments for "current transactions." Adoption of this approach would narrow the issue to whether the transaction in question
involved a "capital transfer" or a payment for a "current transaction."
Inherent in the above "solution," however, is the obvious danger
that the courts could dignify exchange controls that were clearly inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of the Fund Agreement.
CURRENT (INTERNATIONAL) TRANSACrIONS

Article VI, section 3 and article XIX (i) speak in terms of "current transactions" whereas article VIII, section 2 (a) speaks in terms
of "current international transactions." However, it is apparent that
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the two terms are interchangeable. 1 29 Article XIX (i) of the Fund
Agreement expressly defines current transactions as follows:
Payments for current transactions means payments which are
not for the purpose of transferring capital, and includes, without
limitation:
(1) All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other
current business, including services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities;
(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from
other investments;
(3) Payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans
or for depreciation of direct investments;
(4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses. (Emphasis added.)
It is to be noted that the above definition of "current transactions"
is quite broad. Indeed, it has been observed that article XIX (i) has
included certain transactions that might otherwise be regarded as
capital in nature. 130 Apparently the only pronouncement by the the
Fund concerning a current transaction is to be found in a decision
of the executive board of the Fund dated June 1, 1960, in which the
board stated that, in ascertaining whether a country maintains or imposes a restriction on payments and transfers for current international
transactions, the guiding principle or test is whether the article VIII
country is maintaining controls that involve "a direct governmental
limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such."'131
The views of the Fund with regard to invisible transactionsthrows
additional light upon what is embraced by the term current transactions. The Fund has regarded the following as constituting invisible transactions: (1) international transportation of goods; (2)
travel for reasons of business, education, health, et cetera; (3) insurance premiums and payment of claims; (4) investment income,
including interest, rents, dividends, and profits; (5) miscellaneous
service items such as advertising, commissions, film rentals, pensions,
patent fees, royalties, subscriptions to periodicals, and membership
fees; (6) donations, migrant remittances, legacies; (7) repayment of
commercial credit; (8) contractual amortization and depreciation of

129. The United States has adopted the definition of current (international)
transactions as contained in article XIX (i) of the Fund Agreement. See United
States-United Kingdom Financial Agreement, Dec. 6, 1945, §11 (i), 60 Stat. 1841,
1844 (1945).

130.

GOLD,

COMMENTS,

INTERNATIONAL LAW

131.

IMF,

ANN.

ANNUAL

PROCEEDINGS OF

THE AMERICAN

SOCIETY

OF

188 (1960); GOLD, op. cit. supra note 114, at 12-13.
REP. 29-30 (1960).
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direct investment132 One authority has taken the position that the
above enumerated invisible items, including insurance claims, correspond to the definition of "current transactions" as set forth in
article XIX (i) of the Fund Agreement.133 Another writer, in discussing invisible items vis-5-vis balance of payments, also seems to
view payments in respect of invisible items as equivalent to payments
with respect to current transactions.134 Therefore, payments in respect of insurance contracts would appear to be excluded from the
category of capital transfers, for the same writer defines "capital
payments" to include "loans to, capital repaid to, or assets purchased
from, foreign nationals."'135 The same writer views long-term capital
movements as capital transfers whereby nationals of one country acquire bonds, securities, or tangible assets in another country with the
purpose of earning a future income; short-term capital transfers constitute funds that move with some frequence from country to country
either for speculative purposes or because of differences in interest
rates. 3 6 Another writer has indicated that he views the distinction
made in article VIII, section 2 (a) between "capital transfers" and
"current transactions" as a distinction that replaces the older dis37
tinction between financial and commercial payments.
It may be argued that the term "current transactions" has been
given a broad meaning under the Fund Agreement, for article VI,
section 3 of the Fund Agreement seems to equate "payments for current transactions" with "transfers of funds in settlement of commitments."'138 Moreover, a logical application of the proclaimed purposes
of the Fund would be to include normal commercial and service
transactions within the scope of current transactions. 39
It also may be argued that a transaction is outside of the scope of
a "capital transfer" when the creditor is not a resident or national
of the country whose exchange control regulations are involved and
132.

See IMF,

ANNEX TO THE THIRD

ANN. REP.

ON EXCHANGE RETRIrCIONS

(1952).
MIKE.sELL, FOREIGN EXCHANGE IN THE POSTWAR WORD, 68-69 (1954).
134. SCAMMELL, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY 18-19 (1957).
133.

135. Id. at 18.
136. Id. at 20.
137. Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the International Monetary Fund, 59
YArt LJ. 421,423 (1950).
138. Article VII, §3 (b), pertaining to the right of a member, after consultation
with the Fund, to impose limitations on freedom of exchange operations in scarce
currencies, would also support the proposition that the term "current transactions"
is to be given a broad meaning.
139. Thus, the Fund's stated purposes are "To facilitate the expansion and
balanced growth of world trade" (IMF art. I (ii)) and "to assist . . . in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade."
(IMF art I (iv)).
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when the debtor is either an international foreign corporation doing
business in a number of countries and having assets in the country
where performance is sought or is a domiciliary of the country where
performance is sought. If such is the case, and particularly if the
world-wide assets of the debtor corporation stand behind its obligations, enforcement of the contract in a country other than the exchange
control country should not result in a "capital transfer" since there
140
would not be a capital movement.
INSURANCE PAYMENTS AS PAYMENTS IN RESPECT OF CURRENT
TRANSACTIONS

In only one case prior to the Cuban refugee insureds cases have
the provisions of the Fund Agreement been raised as a defense in a
suit involving an insurance claim. In Catz & Lips v. S.A. Union Versicherung,141 decided by the Civil Tribunal of Antwerp in 1949, Dutch
claimants unsuccessfully sought to attach funds of a Czechoslovakian
insurance company located in Belgium. At the time of suit Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Czechoslovakia were members of the Fund and
the defendant set up by way of defense the Fund Agreement and a
Dutch-Czechoslovak Convention of November 15, 1946. The Convention, which had been entered into pursuant to the Fund Agreement, prohibited the transfer of funds from one country to another
in any transaction involving payment of debts incurred prior to
December 20, 1945. The Antwerp Civil Tribunal held that the insurance claimants' action must be denied because the payment of
claims under an insurance policy constituted capital transfers and
because the Dutch-Czechoslovak Convention was entered into pursuant
to article VI, section 3 of the Fund Agreement, which authorized
member countries to take necessary steps to regulate international
capital movements. The Catz case has been criticized on the ground
that the Civil Tribunal of Antwerp was wrong in classifying the payment of an insurance claim as a capital transfer rather than as a
payment in respect of a current transaction.142
The cash surrender value of a policy of life insurance or an endowment or annuity policy before maturity constitutes the minimum

140. Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219, 226-27 (S.D. Fla.
1963); Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 245 La. 755, 161 So. 2d 70,
73-74 (1964); Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Raij, 156 So. 2d 785, 786 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1963); see Comment, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv. 455, 472-74 (1963).
141. 7 8c 8 Jurisprudence du Port D'Anvers 321 (Antwerp Civil Tribunal,
Fifth Chamber 1949), reported briefly in GOLD, op. cit. supra note 92, at 30-32.
142. Meyer, Recognition of Exchange Controls After the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 62 YALE L.J. 867, 903 (1953).
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worth of the policy.1 43 The cash surrender value is related to the
normal life expectancy of the insured, usually as of the date when
the policy was taken out. 4 4 Although the cash surrender value represents what might be termed a savings factor,145 any purported analogy
between the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy and a
savings account must fail. Normally, life insurance, endowments, and
annuities are regarded as forms of family or individual income protection, rather than as strict forms of savings or investment in which there
is the basic expectation of gain rather than of protection. 46
There are a number of factors that tend to negate the argument
that payment of the cash surrender value of an insurance policy to
the insured constitutes either a repayment of an investment or otherwise a payment of a capital nature. Since the cash surrender value
of the policy represents the minimum worth of the policy, it often
follows that the insured will not receive from the insurer an amount
equal to the amount of the premiums that he has paid, for it "is well
known that the cash surrender value of life insurance does not increase
dollar for dollar with the premiums paid.'"147 Secondly, throughout
the term of the policy and until the policy has matured, the insured
is possessed of no identifiable property rights under the policy,' 4 s for
the "premiums when paid become the property of the insurer and the
insured has no interest in them."'

49

The insurance company, during

the term of the policy, moreover, holds no segregated assets for the
insured. 50 Thus, the rights of an insured under an unmatured policy
are only the rights of an obligee under an executory and conditional
contract.' 51 Until the insured exercises the option under his policy
to receive the current cash surrender value of the policy there exists
no debtor-creditor relationship between the insurance company and
the insured. 15 2 Thus, it is only upon the election by the insured,
143. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States, 331 F.2d 29, 36 (1st Cir.
1964).
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid.

146. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of
America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959); Savage v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y.
1963); Spellacy v. American Life Ins. Ass'n, 144 Conn. 346, 131 A.2d 834 (1957).
147. Commissioner v. Charleston Nat'l Bank, 213 F.2d 45, 48 (4th Cir. 1954).
148. United States v. Behrens, 230 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 30 (D. Conn. 1942); Senese v. Senese, 121 N.Y.S.2d 498
(Sup. Ct. 1953).
149. United States v. Behrens, 230 F.2d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1956).
150. United States v. Behrens, 230 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1956); United States
v. Hopkins, 193 F. Supp. 207, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Senese v. Senese, 121 N.Y.S.2d
498, 503 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
151. United States v. Aetna Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 30, 34 (D. Conn. 1942).
152. Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 248 F.2d 57,
59-60 (5th Cir. 1957); United States v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 495, 498
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prior to the maturity of the policy, to exercise his option to take
the cash surrender value of the policy that the rights of the insurance
company and the insured may be said to become fixed.15 3 Election to
take the cash surrender value of a policy before maturity affirmatively
terminates the insurance contract and substitutes the alternative
promise of the insurer to pay a lesser amount than that contracted to
be paid. 5 4 Since the liability of the insurer only becomes current at
the time of the demand for payment of the cash surrender value, payment of the cash surrender value would constitute payment of a current liability arising out of a current transaction in connection with
the policy.' 55 Consequently, the better view is that the payment by an
insurer of the cash surrender value of the policy does not constitute
a capital transaction,156 nor a "capital transfer,"' 157 but rather constitutes payments in respect of a current transaction within the meaning of article XIX (i) of the Fund Agreement. 158
CONCLUSION

The United States became a member of the International Monetary
Fund in 1945. The effect to be given the exchange control laws of
other members of the Fund in this country pursuant to the Fund
Agreement has been raised in relatively few cases prior to the suits
by the Cuban refugees against American and Canadian insurers. The
suits by these Cuban refugees, however, have brought issues into focus
involving the interpretation and applicability of the Fund Agreement.
In the absence of definitive decisions and interpretations of the Fund
Agreement, it is little wonder that the courts in these Cuban insurance
cases have shown little understanding of the Fund Agreement. The
(3d Cir. 1942); United States v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.2d 880, 883
(1st Cir. 1942); Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Merchants' & Mechanics' Bank, 71
F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1934); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kaiser, 193 Miss. 581, 10 So. 2d
766 (1942); 45 C.J.S. Insurance §460 (b) (1946).
153. Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 248 F.2d 57
(5th Cir. 1957); United States v. Garland, 122 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 685 (1941); Pacific States Life Ins. Co. v. Bryce, 67 F.2d 710, 712
(10th Cir. 1933); 45 C.J.S. Insurance §460 (b) (1946).
154. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States, 331 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1964).
155. Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 248 F.2d 57, 59
(5th Cir. 1957); Warren Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 679, 684-85 (5th Cir. 1943).
156. See Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, rehearing denied, 356
U.S. 964 (1958); Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); Bodine v. Commissioner,
103 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1939).
157. See Blanco v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla.
1963).
158. Bayitch, Florida and International Legal Developments 1962-1963, 18 U.
MIAMi L. REV. 321, 350 (1963); Comment, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455, 472 (1963);
see also Meyer, supra note 142, at 903.
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fault lies not with the courts, but with the State Department and perhaps with the Fund itself.
Under article XVIII of the Fund Agreement the executive directors and board of governors of the Fund have been given exclusive
powers of interpretation of the Fund Agreement whenever a question
arises between member countries. The executive directors have announced their willingness to assist in connection with interpretation of
article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement and to advise
whether particular exchange control regulations have been maintained
or imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement. 159 Apparently
the executive directors of the Fund have, never felt obliged to take
the initiative in formally and exhaustively interpreting the complex
provisions of article VIII, section 2 (b). The United States Department of State seems to have remained indifferent to the problems of
interpretation surrounding the language of article VIII, section 2 (b).
A case in point is the failure of the State Department to solicit the
Fund's views upon the consistency of the Cuban exchange control
laws and regulations with the Fund Agreement, particularly in view
of the volume of American business transactions with Cuba and the
amount of American capital tied up in Cuba at the time Castro took
over.
While exclusive powers of interpretation of the Fund Agreement
have been vested in the executive directors in disputes between member countries, there is nothing in the Fund Agreement that prevents
the courts of this country from interpreting the provisions of the
Fund Agreement in private suits. The only restriction upon the
courts under the Articles is to be found in article VIII, section 2 (b)
in those situations in which the transaction in question falls squarely
within the tests spelled out in article VIII, section 2 (b).
A great danger can arise from the apparent passivity of the Fund
and the State Department with respect to the problems of interpretation and application posed by article VIII, section 2 (b). The
danger comes from those writers who expound what might be termed
the per se doctrine of article VIII, section 2 (b). In the view of these
writers, whose influence is quite great owing to the dearth of formal
Fund interpretations or judicial decisions, the plea of the existence
of the exchange control regulations of an article VIII member country
should alone suffice to render a contract unenforceable under article
VIII, section 2 (b) without reference to the fundamental question
whether or not the exchange control regulations invoked as a defense
have been maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement. The danger inherent in this per se approach is that it would
stifle any form of judicial inquiry into the tests spelled out in article
159. IMF ANN. REP. app. XIV, at 82-83 (1949).
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VIII, section 2 (b) and would paralyze any progress in the direction
of resolving the multitude of problems that can and will arise out of
the application of article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Fund Agreement.
This per se approach is implicit in the arguments of the insurers in
Ugalde, Klawans, and Calvo and in the decision of the Florida Supreme Court.
A basic problem posed by the Sabbatino decision of the United
States Supreme Court is whether the American courts in interpreting
the Fund Agreement will be foreclosed from making inquiry into the
consistency of another country's exchange control laws with the Fund
Agreement. 160 One may imagine the scope of this problem when one
considers the variety of ways in which countries may discriminate
against foreigners through exchange control and the variety of ways
in which revenue, penal, and confiscatory measures may be subtly
tied in with and enforced through exchange control measures. Sabbatino raises the question whether the American courts will be compelled to recognize exchange control regulations that no other country
would recognize. In light of Sabbatino, one may ask what an American
court would do if another article VIII country's exchange control regulations were plead as a defense and if it were advised that the Fund
did not regard the exchange control regulations of that country as
being consistent with the Fund Agreement.
The above problems do not have a simple answer and seem to call
for diverse conclusions. On the one hand, the position may be taken
that Sabbatino forecloses judicial inquiry into the validity of the acts
of a foreign state even in the field of exchange control laws or restrictions. This position is supported by the existence of ambiguity and
lack of consensus created by the diverse results reached both by the
courts and commentators in interpreting the Fund Agreement. Since

the Supreme Court seems to require a high degree of consensus concerning a particular area of international law before the courts may

160. The recent Hickenlooper Amendment, which is contained in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1964 and which amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, reverses in part the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Sabbatino. That
amendment provides, in effect, that no court in the United States should decline,
because of the act of state doctrine, to make a determination or to apply principles
of international law in cases in which confiscations by foreign governments occurring after January 1, 1959, are alleged to be contrary to international law. The
courts are free to presume that they may proceed on the merits unless the President officially states that an adjudication in the particular case would embarrass the
conduct of foreign policy. The cut-off date with respect to suits brought pursuant
to the amendment is January 1, 1966. 78 Stat. 1009, 22 U.S.C. §2370(e) (2) (Supp.
1964). The Hickenlooper Amendment would not, however, affect other acts of
foreign sovereigns, as in the field of exchange control, unless they could clearly
be tied in with a confiscatory purpose.
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feel free to disregard the act of state doctrine,16 1 it may be that Sabbatino forecloses judicial inquiry into the area of exchange control regulations. On the other hand, the position may be taken that Sabbatino
precludes the application of the act of state doctrine, thereby allowing
judicial inquiry, when the exchange control laws in question allegedly
contravene the provisions of a multilateral treaty such as the Fund
Agreement. 6 2 In any event, when the Fund itself has made known
that the exchange control laws in question do not meet the test of
consistency, the act of state doctrine should have no application.
A problem of some concern in the light'of the Cuban insurance
cases relates to the over-all questions of confiscation, the act of state
doctrine, and the obligations imposed upon a former article VIII
member of the Fund such as Cuba. A basic purpose of the Fund, as
spelled out in article I (ii) of the Fund Agreement is "to facilitate
the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of
employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic
policy." (Emphasis added.) It has been observed that the Fund is a
guardian of a "code of international good behavior. ' 163 Accordingly,
the novel question presents itself whether, in accepting the obligations
of membership in the Fund, member countries have not opened the
door to scrutiny of acts of confiscation or expropriation that they perform. If the answer is affirmative, then it is logical to conclude that
when the act of state doctrine and the Fund Agreement are raised as
twin defenses in suits between private parties, the Fund Agreement
should take precedence and govern any determination as to whether
relief may be granted.
The basis for the foregoing conclusion lies in the voluntary surrender by each member of the Fund of a certain measure of its sovereiguty upon accepting the treaty obligations of the Fund Agreement.
Through the Fund each member owes certain duties to every other
member. They pledge themselves to the abandonment of unilateral
courses of action that may have detrimental effects on the economies
of other members. It has been observed that under the Fund Agreement there is considerable emphasis placed upon the encouragement
and protection of foreign investment.164 Accordingly, the application
of the act of state doctrine in certain of the Cuban insurance cases
161. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
162. See Falk, The Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 Amf. J. INT'L L. 935, 939 (1964).
163. See FLEMING, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND; ITS FORMf AND
FUNCTIONS 5 (1964).
164. GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACrIONS: SOME LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

12 (1965).

47

Law Review,
Vol. 18, Iss.
UNIVERSITY Florida
OF FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW

1 [1965],
Art. 3
[Vol. XVIII

could produce results contrary to the obligations imposed by the
Fund Agreement.
The Cuban insurance cases raise the question whether article VIII,
section 2 (b) may be utilized to effectuate extra-territorial acts of confiscation in connection with political refugees from a member country
of the Fund. In the cases discussed herein, Cuba had declared the
refugees' rights under their policies confiscated after they had fled
Cuba. It would appear that article VIII, section 2 (b) would have
rendered unenforceable any claims by these refugees against companies
situate here in connection with capital transactions, such as withdrawal of bank accounts physically situated in Cuba. However, the claims
of the Cuban refugees under their policies of insurance with the American and Canadian insurers appear to fall within the category of "current transactions165 and, as such, article VIII, section 2 (b) would not
affect their enforceability in this country even if the American or
Canadian insurers had been required to make payment from their
Cuban funds or assets. 166 However, if it were possible to conclude that
payment of the insurance policies would constitute payments in the
nature of capital transfers, then the confiscatory measures of the
Castro government could have indeed been given extra-territorial effect
and rendered the Cuban insureds' claims unenforceable.
Still another question posed by the Cuban insurance cases is
whether Cuba or any other article VIII member of the Fund may
effectively convert a dollar contract for goods, services, and the like
into a peso contract through exchange control laws and regulations.
While the problem is novel, it would appear that this may not ordinarily be done in the case of current (international) transactions. The
resident of the country should, pursuant to the Fund Agreement, be
permitted to obtain the necessary foreign exchange to make out-payments in dollars. In the case of in-payments, however, the resident of
the exchange control country may be required either to receive a
given currency such as pesos or to surrender any dollars he may receive for pesos. 167 Thus, the only basis for concluding that a country
may rewrite the terms of a written contract in a transaction that
qualifies as a current (international) transaction under the Fund
Agreement is when there are in-payments only. In that event a country may require its resident contracting party to receive a specified
currency when payments are made pursuant to the contract. 6 8 In the
case of insurance contracts, which may involve both in-payments
(payments to residents) and out-payments (payments to foreign in165.
166.
167.
168.

Bayitch, supra note 158, at 350-51; Comment, supra note 158, at 472.
GoLD, op. cit. supra note 164, at 8-9, 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 9.
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surers), it is difficult to concede that the exchange control country
such as Cuba may effectively convert a dollar contract into a peso
contract without imposing a restriction on payments for current transactions prohibited by article VIII, section 2 (a). In an instance such as
this, it appears that the exchange control country cannot accomplish
more than to regulate the manner of performance of the contract, so
far as payment in dollars or pesos to its residents is concerned. The
exchange control country however, cannot compel the foreign insurance company to accept a designated currency, nor may the exchange control country prevent its residents from securing the necessary foreign exchange, such as dollars, to make payments to the
foreign insurer.169
Still another question that arises in connection with the Cuban insurance cases is what would the result have been if Cuba had withdrawn from the Fund prior to the time when suit was brought on
these insurance policies. The answer to this question is that the provisions of the Fund Agreement could not then have been raised as a
defense by the insurers. The provisions of article VIII, section 2 (b)
of the Fund Agreement pertaining to unenforceability would have
had no effect, regardless whether payment under the insurance policies would have contravened Cuban exchange control regulations.170
The gaps in the law and in the interpretation of article VIII,
section 2 (b) and of other provisions of the Fund Agreement make it
imperative that American firms doing business abroad remain constantly aware of the design behind the exchange control regulations
of countries in which they do business. Such firms would be well
advised to solicit the assistance of the State Department and the
Treasury Department in gaining clarification of existing and future
exchange control laws both from the enacting country and from the
executive directors of the Fund. Otherwise, such companies may find
themselves victimized by a more subtle form of "confiscation" than
has heretofore been the case.
The last stage in the history of the Cuban insurance cases came on
April 2, 1964, when Cuba withdrew from participation in the International Monetary Fund, thereby furnishing prima facie evidence
of its unwillingness to abide by the obligations of article VIII membership. Cuba's withdrawal from the Fund lends credence to the
position taken herein that the Cuban exchange control laws and
regulations raised in the Cuban insurance cases were not being maintained consistently with Cuba's obligations under the Fund Agreement.
169. Id. at 7-9, 12.
170. Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 31 Misc. 2d 45, 140 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup.
Ct. 1955); GoLu, op. cit. supra note 164, at 25; IMF art. VIII, §2 (b) (1944).
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